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INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN 
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION:  EVIDENCE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW’S UNITY 
JAMES D. FRY* 
Arbitration is justice blended with charity. 
– Nachman of Bratslav 
INTRODUCTION 
A. Responding to Cynicism 
The relationship between human rights and foreign investment 
law is recognized as complex,1 yet commentators generally agree that 
international investment law and arbitration have an adverse impact 
on the promotion and protection of human rights.  Ryan Suda 
summarizes his recent study by stating: 
[Bilateral investment] treaties, which grant strong protections to 
investors of either state party who are operating in the territory of 
the other party, may impinge upon human rights enforcement and 
realization in several ways. . . . The analysis brings home the need 
for the investment treaty regime to be reformed to take better 
account of the human rights regime, ameliorating situations in 
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 1. See U.N. Economic and Social Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on the Promotion of 
Human Rights, Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights, Trade and 
Investment, ¶¶ 5-19, 56, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/9 (July 2, 2003) [hereinafter High 
Commissioner Report] (noting, inter alia, how the relationship depends on such factors as the 
country in question and investors’ motives). 
02__FRY.DOC 5/27/2008  1:27:26 PM 
78 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 18:77 
which states face conflicting international legal obligations under 
the two regimes.2 
Remi Bachand and Stephanie Rousseau assert, “dispute settlement 
decisions that have a negative impact on policies related to rights 
protection,” among other things, fuel strong concerns over 
international trade and investment agreements undermining human 
rights protections.3  Luke Peterson and Kevin Gray summarize their 
arguments, noting: 
The ability [of arbitral tribunals] to monitor the full human rights 
impacts of emerging investment treaty arbitration is hindered by 
various shortcomings of this process.  Some reform of [the bilateral 
investment treaty regime], including greater transparency, is 
necessary at a minimum, as disputes are now implicating a broad 
range of public policy measures in host states. . . . [I]f investment 
tribunals will be expected to take account of a broader range of 
human rights and human security externalities related to 
investment, this might require further changes to the substantive 
and procedural rules of existing (and future) investment treaties.4 
Jose Alvarez ironically characterizes the NAFTA investment chapter 
(Chapter 11) as “a human rights treaty for a special-interest group”—
namely, foreign investors.5  Indeed, as he asserts, the NAFTA 
investment chapter is “the most bizarre human rights treaty ever 
conceived,” giving the bulk of the rights to the few and ignoring the 
rights of those who are otherwise affected by the investment, 
including individual economic rights, work-related rights as provided 
by Articles 22 to 24 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), and other rights like the right to education under UDHR 
Article 26.6  All of these studies consistently set international 
 
 2. Ryan Suda, The Effect of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Human Rights Enforcement 
and Realization 2 (NYU Global Law Working Paper No. 01, 2005). 
 3. Rémi Bachand & Stéphanie Rousseau, International Investment and Human Rights: 
Political and Legal Issues 1  (Peter Feldstein trans., Rights & Democracy, Background Paper, 
2003),  http://www.ichrdd.ca/english/commdoc/publications/globalization/thinkTank2003/ 
bachandRousseauEng.pdf.  See also Peter Barnacle, Promises and Paradoxes: Promoting 
Labour Rights in International Financial Institutions and Trade Regimes, 67 SASK. L. REV. 609, 
634-35 (2004) (“Enforcement of investor rights [through investment arbitration] will potentially 
affect a wide range of human rights . . . .”). 
 4. Luke Eric Peterson & Kevin R. Gray, International Human Rights in Bilateral 
Investment Treaties and investment Treaty Arbitration 3 (The International Institute for 
Sustainable Development, Research Paper, 2003), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/investment_int_ 
human_rights_bits.pdf. 
 5. Jose Alvarez, Critical Theory and the North American Free Trade Agreement’s Chapter 
Eleven, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 303, 308 (1997). 
 6. Id. at 307-09. 
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investment law and international arbitration against human rights 
considerations.7 
Surprisingly, these studies are light on tangible examples, instead 
relying on hypothetical situations and weak counterfactual reasoning.8  
In contrast, this Study looks at actual international investment 
arbitration cases to determine the relationship between international 
investment law and arbitration, on the one hand, and human rights 
law, on the other.  This Article seeks to undermine the general 
consensus that investment arbitration negatively impacts human 
rights and to present examples where the law applied by international 
investment arbitral tribunals is compatible with, and even supports, 
human rights law by relying on human rights jurisprudence to make 
key determinations.  This Article goes beyond mere theoretical 
debate by looking into the facts in order to provide a solid foundation 
upon which a theory might then be erected, particularly the 
unification of international law. 
In order to respond to the prior studies mentioned above, Part I 
of this Article takes a detailed look at actual tribunal decisions to 
determine the relationship between investment arbitration and 
human rights law.9  Part II expands on this critique by analysing the 
fundamental principles of international arbitration—namely, equality 
of parties and the opportunity to present one’s case, which derive 
from international arbitration’s wholehearted commitment to party 
consent.10  Part III, then, puts the analysis contained in Part I into a 
 
 7. As noted infra Part I(B), “international arbitration” and “international investment 
law” are occasionally used interchangeably in this Article due to the fact that arbitrators 
essentially are interpreting relevant international investment law provisions in a particular 
context.  That said, it is acknowledged that the former is a subset of the latter, so the two can be 
distinguished. 
 8. See, e.g., Suda, supra note 2, at 85-86 (pointing out how Mexico could have argued 
certain things in the ICSID arbitration Técnicas Medioambientales S.A. v. United Mexican 
States); Ursula Kriebaum, Privatizing Human Rights - The Interface Between International 
Investment Protection and Human Rights, 3 TRANSNAT’L DISPUTE MGMT. No. 5, at 3-5 (2006) 
(asserting that there could be a “potential conflict between the consumers’ right of access to 
water and the investor’s right to property,” though leaving out that these two rights have not 
been brought into conflict in arbitral proceedings, and even relying  on a “fictitious scenario” to 
support her arguments); Peterson & Gray, supra note 4, at 5-7, 16, 22-32. 
 9. The research dealing with international arbitration cases underlying this portion was 
intended to be as comprehensive as possible, though the Author cannot rule out the possibility 
that some examples unintentionally were overlooked. 
 10. See S. I. Strong, Intervention and Joinder as of Right in International Arbitration: An 
Infringement of Individual Contract Rights or a Proper Equitable Measure?, 31 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 915, 987 (1998); Robert H. Smit & Nicholas J. Shaw, The Center for Public 
Resources Rules for Non-Administered Arbitration of International Disputes: A Critical and 
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broader theoretical context—the debate surrounding the 
fragmentation of international law—by illustrating how specialized 
bodies of international law can interact without necessarily creating 
conflicts and without an institutional hierarchy that might impose 
order.11  These interactions between specialized bodies of 
international law demonstrate a procedural- or institutional-type of 
unity for the international arbitration regime, as well as a substantive-
type of unity between these two bodies of law.12 
B. Methodology 
In terms of methodology, it is important to note three points.  
First, this Study initially delimited human rights to a general notion of 
human rights, looking at how international arbitral tribunals have 
relied on human rights jurisprudence in their awards and orders, 
without breaking human rights down into their various rights or 
categories.13  The approach of this Article in grouping all human 
rights together makes the analysis more manageable14 and makes an 
inductive analysis possible by letting the general conclusions flow 
directly from the unanticipated empirical findings.  Despite this 
approach, the author acknowledges that not all human rights have (or 
 
Comparative Commentary, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 275, 277 (1997); Frank-Bernd Weigand, 
Introduction to PRACTITIONER’S HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 77-79 
(Frank-Bernd Weigand ed., 2002). 
 11. Those readers who are more interested in theory might want to start with Part III and 
then return to Part II to see how those theoretical arguments fit within this particular context. 
 12. See Vera Gowlland-Debbas, Comment, Unity and Diversity in the Formation and 
Relevance of Customary International Law, in UNITY AND DIVERSITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
285-86 (Andreas Zimmermann & Rainer Hoffmann eds., 2006) (discussing the different types of 
unity within international law). 
 13. There generally are three types, or generations, of human rights, each type having a 
different level of acceptance in the international community.  The first generation includes the 
civil and political rights contained in Articles 3 to 21 of the UDHR and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the second generation includes social, economic and 
cultural rights contained in Articles 22 to 27 of the UDHR and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and the third generation includes unofficial rights that go 
beyond these earlier categories, many of which deal with the right to a healthy environment and 
economic development.  See MANFRED NOWAK, INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME 23-25 (2003).  Advocates are eager to claim a whole host of activities, 
such as the practice of sport, as human rights even though they generally are not recognized as 
such.  See James A.R. Nafziger, Dispute Resolution in the Arena of International Sports 
Competition, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 161, 177-78 (2002) (quoting Olympic Charter, Fundamental 
Principle 8 (2001)). 
 14. Besides, a methodology that focused on searching for a discussion of specific human 
rights within arbitration cases likely would not have resulted in a different set of cases as those 
analyzed here, based on some test searches run towards the end of the research. 
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should have) equal weight,15 especially when comparing so-called 
third-generation rights (involving environmental and development 
rights) with first- and second-generation rights (civil, political, 
economic and social rights).  In the same way that some international 
courts and tribunals do already, those rights that are better 
established generally will need to be taken into account to a greater 
extent than the others.16 
Second, this Article disagrees with the approach that some 
commentators take of merely assuming that human rights are 
involved in an arbitration case dealing with public issues such as 
public health.17  Not only is this not necessarily the case, but the 
involvement of individual rights might not even implicate human 
rights, as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) hinted in the 
LaGrand case when it stated that it was sufficient that an individual’s 
rights were violated without having to say that human rights were 
actually involved.18 
Third, Part II somewhat distinguishes international investment 
arbitration from international investment law (the law that 
 
 15. It is interesting to note that many of the human rights cases cited by arbitral tribunals 
are some of the most important human rights cases.  Moreover, arbitral tribunals seem to rely 
on these cases in their decisions, not merely in their orbiter dicta.  These points suggest that 
arbitral tribunals are not throwing in references to human rights cases merely for the sake of 
appearances. 
 16. See Andrew Clapham, The Jus Cogens Prohibition of Torture and the Importance of 
Sovereign State Immunity, in PROMOTING JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW / LA PROMOTION DE LA JUSTICE, DES DROITS 
DE L’HOMME ET DU RÈGLEMENT DES CONFLITS PAR LE DROIT, LIBER AMICORUM LUCIUS 
CAFLISCH 157 (Marcelo Kohen ed., 2007) (citing Appellate Body Report, European 
Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 172, 
WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001); Appellate Body Report, Korea-Measures Affecting Imports 
of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, ¶ 162, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R (Jan. 10, 2001)). 
 17. See, e.g., Kriebaum, supra note 8, at 18 (“Methanex did not arise in a privatisation 
context but still concerned public health and hence human rights.”); Peterson & Gray, supra 
note 4, at 20 (in explaining how tribunals sometimes allow non-parties to a dispute to “bring 
forward human rights facts and arguments for a Tribunal’s consideration,” the author gives as 
examples two NAFTA arbitrations where the “Tribunals have indicated that they are minded to 
allow written submissions by groups wishing to bring forward arguments based upon sustainable 
development or environmental concerns,” even those are not human rights arguments per se).  
Please note that this assertion does not mean that the Article rejects the notion that public 
health cannot be a human right.  On the contrary, this right seems rather well established.  See 
generally BRIGIT C.A. TOEBES, THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AS A HUMAN RIGHT IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1999).  The simple point being made here is that any reference to public 
health in an arbitral decision is not, ipso facto, a reference to a human right for the purposes of 
this Article. 
 18. See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 494 (June 27). 
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international investment arbitration applies19) in order to analyze the 
relationship between arbitration and human rights. In this way, Part 
II seeks to respond to the criticisms levied against international 
arbitration, principally, that its lack of transparency, legitimacy and 
accountability frustrates states’ efforts to regulate their internal 
activities vis-à-vis human rights obligations.  While the alleged lack of 
transparency raises some concerns that uncertainty can create a 
regulatory chill in host states,20 the dangers to human rights from 
these characteristics of investment arbitration are overexaggerated.  
On the contrary, investment arbitration can be seen as consistent with 
human rights in several different ways, as explained in Parts II and III 
below. 
I.  INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT  
ARBITRATION CASES DEALING WITH HUMAN RIGHTS 
Investment arbitration awards refer to human rights and human 
rights jurisprudence in at least three different ways: (1) in 
determining substantive rules; (2) in determining procedural rules; 
and (3) in dealing with supposed conflicts between human rights and 
international investment law.21  As investment arbitral tribunals tend 
to rely on human rights considerations (with only two tribunals 
actually refusing to do so), it is apparent that international investment 
arbitration does not necessarily undermine human rights, and, in fact, 
tends to support human rights. 
 
 19. But see MAURO RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW AND 
PRACTICE 133-44 (2001) (describing how international arbitration law is its own body of law, 
and quoting several cases to support this assertion); KLAUS PETER BERGER, INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC ARBITRATION 181-82 (1993).  This Article does not see a meaningful difference 
between referring to international arbitration law and the law that international arbital tribunals 
apply.  The Article uses the latter phrase because it would appear to be more of the mainstream 
approach. 
 20. Chill arises from a fear of claims regarding applicable standards, when this fear 
discourages a host state from even thinking of regulating the activities of investors.  See, e.g., 
Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s Investment Protections 
and the Misguided Quest for an International “Regulatory Takings” Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
30, 132-35 (2003). 
 21. Interestingly, human rights and international investment law do not often expressly 
conflict, at least according to investment arbitration awards, hence the need for many of the 
earlier studies mentioned to rely on counterfactual reasoning and hypotheticals.  See text 
accompanying supra note 8. 
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A. Substantive Rules 
Investment arbitration tribunals rely on human rights 
jurisprudence, to varying degrees, to determine the contents of 
certain substantive rules.  Some examples include the definition of 
regulatory expropriation, the need to exhaust local remedies, the 
assement of damages and the allocation costs.  This Part provides 
concrete examples of each. 
1. Defining Regulatory Expropriation.  In establishing the 
standards that governments need to abide by in order to avoid claims 
of regulatory expropriation, investment arbitration tribunals often 
have looked at the right to private property and related human rights 
jurisprudence.  As the UNCITRAL tribunal in the Lauder v. Czech 
Republic case noted, “[BITs] generally do not define the term of 
expropriation and nationalization, or any of the other terms denoting 
similar measures of forced dispossession (‘dispossession’, ‘taking’, 
‘deprivation’, or ‘privation’).”22  As a result, the tribunal had to look 
at some textbooks and the European Court of Human Rights case 
Mellacher v. Austria to derive a neat definition of the different types 
of expropriation: “a ‘formal’ expropriation is a measure aimed at a 
‘transfer of property’, while a ‘de facto’ expropriation occurs when a 
State deprives the owner of his ‘right to use, let or sell (his) 
property.’”23  The Lauder case involved the right to private property.  
Directly after quoting the Mellacher decision, the tribunal held: 
[T]he Respondent did not take any measure of, or tantamount to, 
expropriation of the Claimant’s property rights within any of the 
time periods, since there was no direct or indirect interference by 
the Czech Republic in the use of Mr. Lauder’s property or with the 
enjoyment of its benefits.  The Claimant has indeed not brought 
sufficient evidence that any measure or action taken by the Czech 
Republic would have had the effect of transferring his property or 
of depriving him of his rights to use his property or even of 
interfering with his property rights.24 
That UNCITRAL tribunal, which was convened in London and 
composed of three eminent arbitrators—Robert Briner, Lloyd N. 
Cutler, and Bohuslav Klein—involved a claim based on the U.S.-
Czech Republic Bilateranl Investment Treaty (BIT).  In a parallel 
proceeding over that same underlying dispute but under the 
 
 22. Ronald S. Lauder v. Czech Republic, 2001 WL 34786000, para. 200 (UNCITRAL Final 
Award Sept. 3, 2001). 
 23. Id. (quoting Mellacher v. Austria, 169 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989)). 
 24. Id. paras. 201-02. 
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Netherlands-Czech Republic BIT, an equally eminent UNCITRAL 
panel in Stockholm, Sweden, composed of Wolfgang Kühn, Stephen 
M. Schwebel, and Ian Brownlie (who replaced Jaroslav Hándl), came 
to the exact opposite conclusion: 
The Claimant’s expropriation claim under Article 5 of the Treaty is 
justified. The Respondent, represented by the Media Council, 
breached its obligation not to deprive the Claimant of its 
investment. The Media Council’s actions and omissions, as 
described above, caused the destruction of CNTS’ operations, 
leaving CNTS as a company with assets, but without business. . . . 
The expropriation claim is sustained despite the fact that the Media 
Council did not expropriate CME by express measures of 
expropriation. De facto expropriations or indirect expropriations, 
i.e. measures that do not involve an overt taking but that effectively 
neutralize the benefit of the property of the foreign owner, are 
subject to expropriation claims. This is undisputed under 
international law.25 
The second tribunal did not rely on human rights jurisprudence in 
establishing the standards for expropriation.  One is left to wonder, 
therefore, whether this would explain how the two tribunals came to 
these opposite decisions.26 
Another clear case of such reliance on human rights 
jurisprudence is the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disbutes (ICSID) tribunal in Técnicas Medioambientales 
S.A. v. Mexico, which often is referred to as the Tecmed case.  This 
case is relevant for a number of reasons.  First, the Tecmed tribunal 
looked to an Inter-American Court of Human Rights case to inform 
itself about the finer points of expropriation.  In determining whether 
a certain type of expropriation took place, the tribunal noted that it 
should not “restrict itself to evaluating whether a formal 
dispossession or expropriation took place, but should look beyond 
mere appearances and establish the real situation behind the situation 
that was denounced.”  This approached was required by the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights in Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, which 
 
 25. CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, 2001 WL 34786542, paras. 591, 604 
(UNCITRAL Partial Award Sept. 13, 2001) (internal citations omitted).  See also id. paras. 591-
609, 624; CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, 2003 WL 24070172, paras. 423-25 
(UNCITRAL Final Award Mar. 14, 2003) (reaffirming the Partial Award’s decision to hold the 
Respondent liable for the expropriation, inter alia, in breach of the underlying BIT). 
 26. For more information on these parallel proceedings and some interesting related issues, 
see generally Yuval Shany, Contract Claims vs. Treaty Claims: Mapping Conflicts Between 
ICSID Decisions on Multisourced Investment Claims, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 835, 845-46 (2005); 
James D. Fry, Quasi-In Rem Jurisdiction and Discovery in Enforcing an Arbitration Award: 
Understanding CME Media Enterprises B.V. v. Zelezny, 6 INT’L ARB. L. REV. 100 (2003). 
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involved an individual’s right to private property.27  The Tecmed 
tribunal appears to have taken that case into consideration in 
determining whether a resolution of the National Ecology Institute of 
Mexico constituted an expropriation.28 
Second, the Tecmed tribunal relied on a European Court of 
Human Rights case for the standard of proportionality with regard to 
the public interest in the taking.  Citing Matos e Silva, Lda. v. 
Portugal, the Tecmed tribunal considered whether such regulatory 
actions or measures of the National Ecology Institute of Mexico “are 
proportional to the public interest presumably protected thereby and 
to the protection legally granted to investments, taking into account 
that the significance of such impact has a key role upon deciding the 
proportionality.”29  Citing to another two European Court of Human 
Rights cases, Mellacher v. Austria and Pressos Compañía Naviera v. 
Belgium, the Tecmed tribunal further developed the applicable rule 
on regulatory expropriation by pointing out that “[t]here must be a 
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the charge or 
weight imposed to the foreign investor and the aim sought to be 
realized by any expropriatory measure.”30  Yet again, the Tecmed 
tribunal quoted at length the European Court of Human Rights case 
James v. United Kingdom from 1986 as it explained more of the 
nuances of a legitimate public interest aim when the regulatory taking 
occurs: 
Not only must a measure depriving a person of his property pursue, 
on the facts as well as in principle, a legitimate aim “in the public 
interest,” but there must also be a reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to 
be realised. . . . The requisite balance will not be found if the person 
concerned has had to bear “an individual and excessive burden.” 
. . . The Court considers that a measure must be both appropriate 
for achieving its aim and not disproportionate thereto. . . . [N]on-
nationals are more vulnerable to domestic legislation: unlike 
nationals, they will generally have played no part in the election or 
designation of its authors nor have been consulted on its adoption. 
 
 27. Técnicas Medioambientales S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/2, May 29, 2003, 19 ICSID (W. Bank) 158, 219 (2004), 43 I.L.M. 133, 162-63 (2004) 
(quoting Baruch Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru (Ivcher Bronstein Case), 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 74, paras. 120-24 (Feb. 6, 2001)). 
 28. Id. at 220, 43 I.L.M. at 163. 
 29. Id. at 222, 43 I.L.M. at 164 (citing Matos e Silva, Lda. v. Portugal, 1996-IV Eur. Ct. 
H.R. para. 92). 
 30. Id. (citing Mellacher v. Austria, 169 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 48 (1989); Pressos 
Compañía Naviera v. Belgium, 332 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 38 (1995)). 
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Secondly, although a taking of property must always be effected in 
the public interest, different considerations may apply to nationals 
and non- nationals and there may well be legitimate reason for 
requiring nationals to bear a greater burden in the public interest 
than non-nationals.31 
Somewhat surprisingly, none of the members of the Tecmed panel 
were Europeans,32 which might have explained such reliance on 
European Court of Human Rights cases had it been otherwise.  The 
tribunal in Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic indirectly cited this 
same human rights jurisprudence by relying on these portions of the 
Tecmed decision and even by quoting the European Court of Human 
Rights James v. United Kingdom case quoted above.33 
In the arbitration Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Overseas 
Private Investment Corp., Jamaica was held to have expropriated an 
investor’s property when it imposed new tax measures that stopped 
the claimant from “exercising effective control over the use or 
disposition of a substantial portion of its property.”34  The dissenting 
arbitrator relied on a European Commission of Human Rights 
decision Gudmundsson v. Iceland and its interpretation of the general 
principles of international law contained in Article 1 of Additional 
Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights.  
Article 1 speaks of the “the right of a State . . . to secure the payment 
of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”35  When this same issue 
of expropriation through the imposition of new taxes came up in 
EnCana Corp. v. Ecuador, the London Court of International 
Arbitration (LCIA) tribunal discussed this language in Revere Copper 
at great length.  In particular, the EnCana tribunal pointed out that 
the dissenting arbitrator’s opinion in Revere Copper—that the tax 
there was not “unreasonable by normal standards of tax enactments 
in the international community”—did not mean that all unreasonable 
taxes will constitute an indirect expropriation.36  The EnCana tribunal 
concluded that “[o]nly if a tax law is extraordinary, punitive in 
 
 31. James v. United Kingdom, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) paras. 50, 63 (1986). 
 32. See Ben Hamida, Investment Arbitration and Human Rights, 4 TRANSNAT’L DISPUTE 
MGMT. No. 5, at 14 (2007). 
 33. Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, June 23, 2006, 2006 
WL 2095870, paras. 311-12 (ICSID (W. Bank)). 
 34. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Overseas Private Inv. Corp. (U.S. v. Jam.), 56 I.L.R. 
258, 291-92 (Am. Arb. Ass’n 1978). 
 35. Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Protocol, 
art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262. 
 36. EnCana Corp. v. Ecuador, 2005 WL 3804543, para. 176 (London Ct. Int’l Arb. 2006). 
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amount or arbitrary in its incidence would issues of indirect 
expropriation be raised,” thus finding that “the denial of VAT 
refunds in the amount of ten percent of transactions associated with 
oil production and export did not deny EnCana ‘in whole or 
significant part’ the benefits of its investment.”37  Although the 
EnCana tribunal cited a domestic arbitration case that quoted a 
decision of a human rights body, this can be considered indirect 
reliance on a human rights decision, even though the tribunal 
ultimately distinguished that decision from the case before it. 
Yet another example of the usefulness of human rights decisions 
in the investment-arbitration context can be found in International 
Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, an ICSID case 
where Thomas Wälde explained in his separate opinion that the 
proper analogy in interpreting NAFTA Chapter 11 obligations was 
not to international commercial arbitration or general public 
international law, both of which traditionally involve disputants who 
are seen as equals, but rather to judicial review relating to 
governmental conduct, such as that observed in the European or 
Inter-American Human Rights Courts, where there is a power 
inequality between the parties.38  Wälde’s discussion is not just 
theoretical, but actually relies on European Court of Human Rights 
cases to make his point.  In particular, he relies, inter alia, on three 
European Court of Human Rights cases to establish that there is a 
key principle of international law known as “legitimate expectations” 
that governs the relationship between the state and individuals.39  This 
principle requires the state to “respect legitimate expectations it has 
created with individuals, in particular if such expectations have 
become the basis for investment.”40  Under NAFTA Article 1105, 
such a principle of international law “trump[s] the application of 
domestic law—such as Mexican gambling law as interpreted by the—
then—new Mexican government.”41  Although this treatment of 
human rights jurisprudence within the international-arbitration 
context was done in a separate opinion, it shows the extent to which 
 
 37. Id. para. 177. 
 38. See Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.), 2006 WL 
247692, para. 13 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2006) (Thomas W. Wälde, separate opinion). 
 39. Id. para. 27 (citing Kopecký v. Slovakia, App. No. 44912/98, 2004-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 
para. 35; Djidrovski v. Macedonia, App. No. 46447/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 68 (2005); Dangeville 
v. France, App. No. 36677/97, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. para. 26. 
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arbitrators are willing to base their analysis on human rights 
jurisprudence. 
The final arbitration case to be discussed in this Section is the 
2007 ICSID arbitration Saipem S.p.A. v. Bangladesh, which is quite 
unique from other expropriation cases in that it involved the alleged 
expropriation of an expropriation claim.42  There, Saipem, an Italian 
company, claimed that the respondent unlawfully disrupted an 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) arbitration through the 
interference by domestic courts.43  The disruption frustrated the 
claimant’s rights to arbitrate under the contract and constituted an 
expropriation of its arbitration award.44  Somewhat surprisingly, 
Bangladesh did not argue that arbitral awards cannot be 
expropriated, despite the fact that a claim of expropriation of an 
expropriation claim appeared to be novel at that time.45  More 
importantly for this Study, the tribunal cited several cases from the 
European Court of Human Rights—Stran Greek Refineries and 
Stratis Andreadis v. Greece and Brumarescu v. Romania—for the 
proposition that arbitration awards confer on parties a right to the 
sums awarded.46   
The tribunal was also faced with the question of whether the 
judicial branch of a government can expropriate an investor’s 
property, since it usually is the executive branch that is charged with 
expropriation.47  The tribunal found no reason why a judicial act could 
not rise to the level of an expropriation, especially as there was no 
mention of such a restriction in the relevant BIT and the respondent 
did not cite decisions to support its position.48  The European Court of 
Human Rights case Allard v. Sweden seemed to be dispositive of the 
issue for the tribunal.  There the Court concluded that a court 
 
 42. See generally Saipem S.p.A. v. Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, Decision on 
Jurisdiction and Recommendation on Provisional Measures, Mar. 21, 2007, 2007 WL 1215072 
(ICSID (W. Bank)). 
 43. Id. para. 129. 
 44. See id. paras. 61, 129. 
 45. The tribunal had, however, pointed out that such an argument would not have been 
persuasive to them since the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal has held—for example, in the Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Iran case—that a state can expropriate immaterial rights.  See id. para. 130 
(citing Phillips Petroleum Company v. Iran, Award 425-39-2, 21 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 79, 
para. 75 (1989)). 
 46. Id. (citing Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, App. No. 13427/87, 
301-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) paras. 59-62 (1994); Brumarescu v. Romania, App. No. 28342/95, 
1999-VII Eur. Ct. H.R., 10 HUM. RTS. CASE DIG. 237-41 (1999)). 
 47. Id. paras. 131-32. 
 48. See id. para. 132. 
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decision may constitute expropriation, even though the determination 
of whether there actually had been an expropriation was reserved 
until the merits phase of the dispute.49  Thus, the Saipem case not only 
shows that even the most recent arbitral decisions are relying on 
human rights jurisprudence, but that they are relying on such 
jurisprudence to resolve a wide array of issues. 
In sum, tribunals often rely heavily on jurisprudence from human 
rights courts to help them understand the limits of expropriation.  
This is largely due to the fact that the right to private property, or 
rather the right to the freedom from arbitrary deprivation of private 
property, is quite well developed there vis-à-vis international 
investment law. 
2. Exhaustion of Local Remedies.  Investment arbitral tribunal 
reliance on human rights jurisprudence as a guide to substantive rules 
is not limited to defining regulatory expropriation.  For example, 
arbitral tribunals have looked to human rights jurisprudence when 
they have discussed exhaustion of local remedies, the assessment of 
damages, the allocation of costs, and the non-retroactivity of 
particular laws.  Although the human rights cases involved in each 
category are far less noteworthy than the cases discussed in Part 
I(A)(1), these examples show the breadth of topics that investment 
arbitral tribunals look to human rights jurisprudence for direction. 
Concerning the exhaustion of local remedies, the Loewen 
NAFTA tribunal relied on Nielsen v. Denmark, a decision in the 
Yearbook of the European Commission on Human Rights, to support 
the idea that a complainant must exhaust all adequate and effective 
remedies.50  While this is a well established principle of international 
law, it is interesting to note that a tribunal that feels obliged to cite 
something for this proposition would cite a decision of a human rights 
treaty body, thus showing its respect for human rights jurisprudence. 
3. Assessment of Damages and Allocation of Costs.  In Amco 
Asia Corp. v. Indonesia, the ICSID tribunal considered human rights 
cases for substantive points of law dealing with the assessment of 
damages.  In 1979, Indonesia gave the claimants an investment license 
 
 49. See id. (citing Allard v. Sweden, App. No. 35179/97, 2003-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 310). 
 50. The Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, June 26, 
2003, 7 ICSID (W. Bank) 442, 42 I.L.M. 811, 838, para. 165 (2003) (citing Nielsen v Denmark, 
1958-1959 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R. 412, 436, 438, 440, 444 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R.). 
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for hotel management.51  In 1980, a military official took over 
management by a “Decree or Letter of Decision.”52  The Capital 
Investment Coordination Board of Indonesia, which was responsible 
for examining applications by foreign investors, making 
recommendations to the Indonesian Government and supervising the 
implementation of approved investments, terminated the license with 
the Indonesian President’s approval.53  The claimant asserted that 
Indonesia unjustifiably cancelled its investment license.54  The first 
arbitral tribunal agreed and ordered Indonesia to pay the claimants 
$3.2 million.55  Indonesia filed an application for annulment with the 
ICSID Secretariat, and the award was annulled in part.56  The 
claimants then resubmitted the dispute under Rule 55 of the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules57 
After finding that the revocation of the investment license at 
issue was done in bad faith,58 the tribunal turned to the question of the 
legal consequences for this and other findings.59  After determining 
that Indonesian law did not provide for whether procedurally 
unlawful acts per se generate compensation,60 the tribunal looked to 
see if international law provided for such compensation.  Both 
Indonesia and a legal opinion by Professor Bowett cited numerous 
European Court of Human Rights cases to argue that “procedural 
violations do not generate damages where there remains the 
possibility that the substantive decision might be the same.”61  The 
Sramek case of 1984, for instance, was about whether Austria violated 
Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, which 
provides for an individual’s right to have “a fair and public hearing 
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law.”62  While the court found there to have been a 
violation, the court refused to give the applicant pecuniary losses that 
 
 51. See Amco Asia Corp. v. Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Award for Resubmitted 
Case, May 31, 1990, 1 ICSID (W. Bank) 569, para. 9 (1993). 
 52. Id. para. 11. 
 53. Id. para. 12. 
 54. Id. para. 15. 
 55. Id. para. 16. 
 56. Id. paras. 17-18. 
 57. Id. para. 19. 
 58. Id. paras. 91-112. 
 59. Id. para. 113. 
 60. Id. para. 121. 
 61. Id. para. 125. 
 62. Id. (citing Sramek v. Austria, 84-I Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1984)). 
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had been claimed.63  The Amco Asia arbitral tribunal discussed that 
case at some length: 
It is true that the European Court said that “the evidence in the file 
does not warrant the conclusion that had it been differently 
composed [the tribunal] would have arrived at a decision in Mrs 
Sramek’s favour.”  It is against that background that Indonesia 
argues that no compensation was paid for a procedural violation, 
where there existed the possibility that the same outcome might 
have occurred even had there been no procedural violation.64 
Ultimately the tribunal distinguished Amco Asia from Sramek 
because the decision was made under Article 50 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights rather than under general international 
law.65  Indonesia and Professor Bowett similarly attempted to use the 
European Court of Human Rights’ Golder case for the premise that 
not every violation (procedural or substantive) entitles an award of 
“just satisfaction” under Article 50 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, though again this case was distinguished for not being 
on point.66  Ultimately, the tribunal did not reject the reasoning or 
rights embodied in the European Court of Human Rights cases; it 
merely distinguished them on the facts, as tribunals often do. 
In deciding how to allocate the costs for legal representation, 
Wälde, once again, referred to the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) in International Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United 
Mexican States.  Wälde notes that the ECHR creates “[t]he judicial 
practice most comparable to treaty-based investor-state arbitration,” 
to assert that “states have to defray their own legal representation 
expenditures, even if they prevail.”67  In reality, it is not the European 
Convention on Human Rights that established this, but rather the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.  Regardless, 
it is another example of how a human rights court can influence the 
practice of investment arbitration. 
4. Retroactivity of the Law.  Yet another example of how 
investment arbitral tribunals consider human rights jurisprudence 
when reaching their decision is when a tribunal decides on the 
substantive law relating to non-retroactivity of law.  The Mondev 
 
 63. See id. 
 64. Id. para. 126. 
 65. See id. para. 127. 
 66. See id. para. 128 (citing Golder v. United Kingdom 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1975)). 
 67. Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.), 2006 WL 
247692, para. 141 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2006) (separate opinion of Thomas W. Wälde). 
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NAFTA arbitration involved Mondev (a Canadian corporation) that 
had brought a NAFTA Article 1105 (Minimum Standard of 
Treatment) claim against the United States when the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court upheld a trial court judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict in favour of the Boston Redevelopment 
Authority (BRA).  The court determined that the Authority was 
immune from liability for interference with contractual relations by 
reason of a Massachusetts statute giving BRA immunity from suit for 
intentional torts.68  Among Mondev’s claims was one asserting that 
the Massachusettes court did not consider whether the statute on 
which it relied applied retroactively, in contravention of its own 
rules.69  In deciding whether this was a valid claim, the tribunal made 
a very loose analogy to three European Court of Human Rights cases 
that apparently imposed criminal liability where no such criminal 
liability existed when the crime was committed.70  The tribunal then 
went on to cite two European Court of Human Rights decisions 
involving civil matters where rules apparently were applied 
retroactively.71  On its way to eventually dismissing the claims against 
the United States, the tribunal dismissed the argument concerning 
retroactivity without much discussion.72  Just as with the Tecmed case, 
none of the arbitrators on that panel were European, which makes 
the panel’s reference to the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights that much more interesting. 
In the Tradex Hellas S.A. v. Albania ICSID case, Albania 
objected to the jurisdiction of the tribunal because the dispute arose 
before a certain Albanian law was passed that allowed for arbitration 
of such disputes.73  Albania claimed that allowing arbitration of the 
dispute there would be an unacceptable retroactive application of 
that Albanian law.74  As support for this presumption of non-
 
 68. Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Oct. 11, 2002, 6 
ICSID (W. Bank) 192, para. 1 (2004), 42 I.L.M. 85, 86 (2003) (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib.). 
 69. See id. para. 137, 42 I.L.M. at 112. 
 70. See id. para. 138, 42 I.L.M. at 112 (citing S.W. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 20166/92, 
335-B Eur. Ct. H.R., paras. 34-36 (1995); C.R. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 20190/92, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 51, paras. 32-34 (1995); Streletz, Kessler & Krenz v. Germany, App. Nos. 34044/96; 
35532/97; 44801/98, 2001-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 230, para. 50). 
 71. See  id. n.75, 42 I.L.M. at 119 (citing Carbonara & Ventura v. Italy, App. No. 24638/94, 
2000-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 206, paras. 64-69; Agoudimos & Cefallonian Sky Shipping Co. v. Greece, 
App. No. 38703/97, 2001 Eur. Ct. H.R. 406, paras. 29-30). 
 72. See id. 
 73. See generally Tradex Hellas S.A. v. Albania, ICSID Case No. ARB/94/2, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, Dec. 24, 1996, 14 ICSID (W. Bank) 161 (1999). 
 74. See id. at 185-95. 
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retroactivity, Albania asserted that such a principle was “consistent 
with principles of general international law, supported by 
international jurisprudence, and by analogy to the protection of 
investment property rights in human rights law.”75  The tribunal did 
not dismiss the existence of such a presumption in general 
international law or even human rights law, though it did not consider 
that such a presumption could be applied to international arbitration.  
In particular, the tribunal concluded that it was “not convinced that 
such a presumption can be established in international arbitration[; 
s]ubmissions to arbitration, both in arbitration between states and in 
international commercial arbitration, are found in practice both 
regarding disputes that have already arisen and regarding future 
disputes.”76  This would appear to be the first of two examples in 
investment arbitration where human rights law or jurisprudence was 
mentioned but was not considered as useful to deciding an investment 
dispute.77 
5. The Right to Water.  The right to water has been referred to 
in several investment arbitration cases.  Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. 
Bolivia dealt with whether the claimant was a Bolivian entity 
“controlled directly or indirectly” by nationals of the Netherlands as 
required by the Netherlands-Bolivia BIT. The Respondents pointed 
to three statements of Dutch ministers dealing with whether they 
considered that BIT to be applicable in similar circumstances.78  In the 
third statement, the exchange started with a group of five Dutch MPs 
asking three Cabinet-level ministers whether they were familiar with 
the publication Water, Human Rights or Merchandise and their 
general opinion of the publication.79  The Ministers responded that 
“[a]ccess to safe and clean water is important” and concluded by 
saying that the Dutch Government “is of the view that the investment 
treaty is not applicable to this particular case.80  However, this 
reference to the right to water is not particularly relevant.  This might 
have been different had the parties not settled their dispute and 
withdrawn the claim, which might have made it possible for 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See infra text accompanying notes 136-43 (providing a discussion of the second 
example). 
 78. Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, 
Oct. 21, 2005, 20 ICSID (W. Bank) 450, 528-29, paras. 252-55 (2005). 
 79. Id. at 529, para. 255. 
 80. Id. 
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commentators such as Kriebaum to rely on an actual arbitration case 
as opposed to a fictitious scenario to make their points concerning the 
negative impact that international investment arbitration can have on 
the right to water.81 
Still, the relationship between the right to water and investment 
arbitration would appear to be a favorite topic of commentators who 
make normative arguments for why investment arbitral tribunals 
ought to take into consideration the human rights obligations of states 
when they decide whether their treatment of foreign investors has 
violated any international investment law.82  After some research, it 
would appear that there are no positive examples of such a 
relationship.  Some commentators talk about the Compañia de Aguas 
del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentine Republic ICSID arbitration where the 
right to water might arise during the rehearing,83 but the award does 
not make it clear that Argentina relied on a perceived obligation to 
protect the right to water in defending itself.  Rather, the tribunal 
noted the differences between the parties in “the method of 
measuring water consumption, the level of tariffs for customers, the 
time and percentage of any increase in tariffs, the remedy for non-
payment of tariffs, the right of the (investor) to pass-through to 
customers certain taxes and the quality of the water delivered.”84  
Notably, a so-called right to water was not mentioned.  The same 
appears to be true with the Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic 
(which involved a dispute over water),85 even though commentators 
still cite it in the course of making their normative arguments.86  Yet 
again, the same is true with Aguas del Tunari and the wishful thinking 
of commentators.87  While commentators are correct in pointing out 
that Mexico could have argued in the Tecmed arbitration that it had 
to abide by its obligation to protect the right to water when it acted 
 
 81. Kriebaum, supra note 8, at 3-5.  See also High Commissioner Report, supra note 1, at 28 
(asserting that Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Bolivia “while not necessarily the rule, does raise 
serious questions for the enjoyment of the right to water,” though this statement was made 
before the parties in the case settled the dispute). 
 82. See, e.g., Peterson & Gray, supra note 4, at 22-32. 
 83. See id. at 27.  It is possible that Peterson and Gray were thinking of a different case 
than Compañia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentine Republic, though it is unclear from 
their writings. 
 84. See id. at 32. 
 85. See generally Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, June 
23, 2006, 2006 WL 2095870 (ICSID (W. Bank)). 
 86. See, e.g., Peterson & Gray, supra note 4, at 27-28. 
 87. See, e.g., Kriebaum, supra note 8, at 3-5. 
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against the interests of the investors there,88 this does not change the 
fact that Mexico did not make this argument, let alone was it relied on 
by the tribunal. 
Admittedly, quite a few international instruments talk of the 
right to water.89  Moreover, there have been pronouncements on the 
international level by human rights bodies that address the state 
obligations to protect the right to water.  For example, the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has provided a 
General Comment (its interpretation of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)) with regard to 
the right to water and the supposed obligations on states to take 
measures to protect that right, such as to ensure that water is 
affordable and is equitably distributed.90  However, such ICESCR 
comments are non-binding and do not create enforceable 
entitlements.  Contrary to the assertion of Peterson and Gray,91 the 
degree to which the ICESCR is binding on state-parties is even 
questionable due to the extremely vague and non-committal language 
of its Article 2: 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, 
individually and through international assistance and co-operation, 
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available 
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization 
of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate 
means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.92 
Indeed, “undertakes to take steps” suggests that states are not 
committing to anything; “to the maximum of its available resources” 
 
 88. See Suda, supra note 2, at 86.  See also supra text accompanying note 8. 
 89. See generally Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Le Droit à l’Eau, Un Droit International? [The Right 
to Water, An Internaional Right?] (European Univ. Inst. Working Paper Law No. 2006/06, 2006) 
(discussing, inter alia, such instruments as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Third Geneva 
Convention of 1949, and the Second Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, all of 
which provide for a right to water or access to a water supply); LAURENCE BOISSON DE 
CHAZOURNES, LES RESSOURCES EN EAU ET LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [WATER RESOURCES 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW] (2005). 
 90. See General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water (arts. 11 and 12 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), U.N. GAOR Comm. on Econ., Soc., and 
Cult. Rights, 29th Sess., 27 U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (2002). 
 91. See Peterson & Gray, supra note 4, at 24.  See also Kriebaum, supra note 8, at 11-13 
(after discussing General Comment No. 15, stating, inter alia, that  “[t]he human right to water 
entitles everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for 
personal and domestic use” (emphasis added)). 
 92. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights art. 2(1), Dec. 16, 
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976). 
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indicates that obligations depend on the size of a state’s economy 
with states having discretion to decide; “achieving progressively” is 
entirely unclear; and “the adoption of legislative measures” is an 
insufficient measure for protecting any supposed rights that the 
ICESCR establishes.  The vagueness of these so-called obligations 
under the ICESCR possibly is why Mexico did not make this 
argument in the Tecmed arbitration, and other states have refrained 
from even suggesting such a conflicting obligation under human rights 
law.  This Article recognizes that more research needs to be done 
regarding this relationship, though the author is skeptical that there is 
any solid basis for requiring investment arbitral tribunals to give 
priority to states’ human rights obligations over their investment 
treaty obligations, barring the involvement of jus cogens norms. 
B. Procedural Rules 
Just as investment arbitral tribunals have mentioned human 
rights and human rights jurisprudence to determine the contents of 
substantive rules, such tribunals also look to human rights and human 
rights jurisprudence to make procedural determinations, such as 
whether to allow amicus curiae and whether to set aside an award. 
1. Amicus Curiae.  Arbitral tribunal decisions which mention 
human rights jurisprudence have discussed whether amicus curiae 
briefs are acceptable in arbitral proceedings.  When allowed to submit 
such briefs, the third-parties have relied on human rights 
considerations in their attempts to influence the tribunal. 
In deciding whether to allow amicus curiae briefs in the Aguas 
Argentinas v. Argentine Republic ICSID investment arbitration, the 
tribunal determined that such briefs have been allowed in private 
litigation cases that “have involved issues of public interest . . . [and 
that they] have the potential, directly or indirectly, to affect persons 
beyond those immediately involved as parties in the case.”93  The 
tribunal applied this to the case before it and concluded that “[t]he 
factor that gives this case particular public interest is that the 
investment dispute centers around the water distribution and sewage 
systems of a large metropolitan area, the city of Buenos Aires and 
surrounding municipalities.”94  In particular, the tribunal placed 
 
 93. Aguas Argentinas, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in 
Response to a Petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae, May 19, 2005, 21 
ICSID (W. Bank) 342, 347 (2006). 
 94. Id. 
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particular importance on the fact that such systems “provide basic 
public services to millions of people and as a result may raise a variety 
of complex public and international law questions, including human 
rights considerations.”95  The tribunal allowed a joint amicus curiae 
brief by five interested NGOs, because they were deemed to be well 
respected and to have sufficient expertise and experience with human 
rights and public services.96  Though there do not appear to be any 
other decisions that have extended this line of reasoning, it is 
conceivable that such reasoning found in Aguas Argentinas will be 
applied where other investment arbitrations involve such human 
rights considerations.97 
It is important to note, however, that not all arguments that cite 
human rights considerations in support of allowing amicus curiae 
briefs are accepted by arbitral tribunals.  For example, in the 
UNCITRAL case United Parcel Service of America Inc v. Canada, the 
Canadian Union of Postal Workers and the Council of Canadians 
petitioned the Tribunal to be given standing as parties to the dispute.98  
The petitioners’ amici curiae cited, inter alia, Articles 14 and 26 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International Labour 
Conventions for why they should be considered parties to the dispute 
because of the right to a fair and public hearing and equality before 
the law.99  Although the respondent did not address the petitioners’ 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. See Aguas Argentinas, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order 
in Response to a Petition by Five Non-Governmental Organizations for Permission to Make an 
Amicus Curiae Submission, Feb. 12, 2007, paras. 25, 27 (ICSID (W. Bank)), available at 
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/SuezVivendiamici.pdf (last visited July 14, 2007). 
 97. This decision appears to have been cited in only one other decision - by the claimant in 
the ICSID case Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. Tanzania to argue that there is no broad trend 
on transparency as the respondent was claiming.  See Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. 
Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Procedural Order No. 3, Sept. 29, 2006, 2006 WL 
2955444, para. 72.  That tribunal concluded that there had been a trend towards greater 
transparency in ICSID proceedings but suggested that perhaps the trend was not as strong as 
the respondent had been claiming.  See id. paras. 121-22 (asserting that there is no general duty 
of confidentiality in ICSID arbitrations, though there is no general rule of transparency either).  
The Biwater Gauff tribunal issued a Procedural Order on April 25, 2007, informing the third-
party petitioners that the parties had agreed that “no further intervention of the Amici in these 
proceedings is necessary.” Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. Tanzania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/22, Procedural Order No. 6, Apr. 25, 2007, para. 3, available at 
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/chronological_list.htm. 
 98. See generally United Parcel Service of America Inc. v. Canada (U.S. v. Canada), 
Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae, 2001 
WL 34804267 (Nafta Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2001). 
 99. See id. para. 22. 
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right to participate under international law,100 the tribunal rejected the 
petitioners’ argument when it determined that “international law and 
practice and related national law and practice have either ignored or 
given very low priority to third party intervention.”101  Thus, it would 
appear that this is a controversial point. 
2. Setting Aside Arbitral Awards.  In an effort to have the 
UNCITRAL award in Republic of Ecuador v. Occidental Exploration 
set aside, Ecuador challenged, in English court, the award granted by 
arbitrators appointed according to the U.S.-Ecuador BIT.102  
Occidental Exploration raised an objection as to whether the English 
courts could interpret provisions of the BIT,103 but the trial judge 
decided that it was justiciable.  Occidental appealed.104  The decision 
by the Supreme Court of Judicature, Court of Appeal (civil division) 
dealt with the issue of whether Occidental (a U.S. corporation) was 
enforcing rights of the United States under the U.S.-Ecuador BIT.105  
After relying on cases by the Permanent Court of International 
Justice (PCIJ) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ), among 
other sources, the Court of Appeals determined that the “[o]ne 
feature of the traditional protection is that it is up to the protecting 
State of the injured national whether and how far to make it 
available.”106  The Court then pointed out: 
Bilateral investment treaties such as the present introduce a new 
element, and create a “very different” situation . . . [where t]he 
protection of nationals is crystallised and in the present Treaty 
expanded to cover every kind of investment “owned or controlled 
directly or indirectly by nationals or companies of the other Party” 
(Article 1), but the investor is given direct standing to pursue the 
State of the investment in respect of any “investment dispute.”107 
The Court concluded that it is well established that treaties in 
contemporary international law give rise to direct rights for 
individuals, “particularly where the treaty provides a dispute 
resolution mechanism capable of being operated by such individuals 
 
 100. See id. para. 34. 
 101. Id. para. 40. 
 102. Republic of Ecuador v. Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co., [2005] EWHC (Comm) 
774 (Q.B.) (U.K.). 
 103. Id. 
 104. See id. para. 86. 
 105. See Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. v Ecuador, [2005] EWHC (Civ) 1116, para. 14 
(U.K.). 
 106. See id. para. 15. 
 107. Id. para. 16. 
02__FRY.DOC 5/27/2008  1:27:26 PM 
2007] EVIDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW’S UNITY 99 
acting on their own behalf and without their national state’s 
involvement or even consent.”108  In reaching this conclusion, the 
Court relied, inter alia, on the European Convention of Human 
Rights, which provides that the Convention is “enforceable by victims 
of the breach of such rights, and ‘any person, non-governmental 
organisation or group of individuals’ may seek to establish that he is a 
victim by bringing a direct claim before the European Court of 
Human Rights in Strasbourg.”109  The Court turned immediately to 
analogizing this to the instant BIT, where the Court found that “its 
language makes clear that injured nationals or companies are to have 
a direct claim for their own benefit in respect of all [the types of 
claims made].”110  Therefore, the Court concluded that the investors 
were correct in pursuing their rights under the BIT.111 
3. General Procedural Similarities.  Arbitral tribunals have 
noted the procedural similarities with human rights courts.  The 
separate opinion by Bryan Schwartz in NAFTA S.D. Myers, Inc. v. 
Canada indicates that arbitral tribunals, when determining whether 
there has been a denial of national treatment (there, under NAFTA 
Article 1102), will look at the same list of factors as a human rights 
court would look at to determine whether someone’s right to freedom 
from discrimination had been violated.112  In fact, he seems to equate 
“national treatment” with a human-rights type of discrimination, 
concluding the following: 
The export ban did not, on its face, expressly discriminate in favour 
of Canadian operators and against U.S. operators. Both were 
prohibited from engaging in exports.  The intent and practical 
effect of the measure, however, make it clear that it was 
discriminatory and inconsistent with Articles 1102(1) and 1102(2) 
of NAFTA.113 
From the cases discussed above, one cannot help but get the sense 
that human rights and human rights jurisprudence has a far greater 
influence on investment arbitration (both substantively and 
procedurally) than the prior studies on this subject have indicated. 
 
 108. Id. para. 19. 
 109. Id. (quoting European Convention art. 34, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221). 
 110. Id. para. 20. 
 111. See id. para. 22. 
 112. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Nov. 12, 2000, 40 I.L.M. 1408, 1447 (2001) (separate 
opinion of Bryan Schwartz) (concurring except with respect to performance requirements in the 
partial award of the tribunal). 
 113. Id. at 1476, para. 184. 
02__FRY.DOC 5/27/2008  1:27:26 PM 
100 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 18:77 
C. Cases Where Human Rights and International Investment Law 
Supposedly Conflict 
Some commentators assert that “there have been no known 
investment treaty arbitrations where host states have adverted to . . . 
human rights obligations.”114  This is not actually the case.  There are 
an extremely limited number of investment arbitration cases where 
human rights obligations have been pitted against BIT obligations.  
Tellingly, the tribunals in these cases did not seem to take the 
argument seriously.  Argentina in Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic 
argued that its obligations under human rights treaties to protect 
consumers’ rights conflicted with its U.S.-Argentina BIT obligations.  
Human rights obligations, it argued, ought to trump the private 
interests of service providers.  Argentina appears to have made a half-
hearted effort to argue this, because the tribunal noted that “the 
matter has not been fully argued,”115 which could possibly indicate 
that this argument was not made in good faith.  Azurix responded 
that the user’s rights were protected by the provisions made in the 
Concession Agreement, and that it was unclear how termination 
impacted such rights.116  Regardless, the tribunal noted that it “fail[ed] 
to understand the incompatibility in the specifics of the instant case,” 
and that “[t]he services to consumers continued to be provided 
without interruption by ABA during five months after the 
termination notice and through the new provincial utility after the 
transfer of service,”117 thus indicating that, though open to the 
consideration of the issue, it saw the alleged conflict as spurious. 
Again, Argentina made the same type of argument in CMS Gas 
Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic.  First, Argentina pointed out 
that “the protection of the right of property enshrined in the 
Constitution has been interpreted by the Courts as not having an 
absolute character and that State intervention in the regulation of 
individual rights is justified, provided such intervention is both legal 
 
 114. Suda, supra note 2, at 63; Peterson & Gray, supra note 4, at 24; see also id. at 33-34 
(though petitioners couched the argument about the effect of damages on the state’s ability to 
provide water to its citizens in ‘rights’ language, they “did not advert to any national or 
international human rights norms which might have reinforced their arguments”). 
 115. Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, June 23, 2006, 2006 
WL 2095870, para. 261 (ICSID (W. Bank)). 
 116. See id. para. 254. 
 117. Id. para. 261. 
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and reasonable when factoring in social needs.”118  Argentina then 
asserted the following: 
[W]hile treaties override the law they are not above the 
Constitution and must accord with constitutional public law.  Only 
some basic treaties on human rights have been recognized by a 
1994 constitutional amendment as having constitutional standing 
and, therefore, in the Respondent’s view, stand above ordinary 
treaties such as investment treaties. It is further argued that, as the 
economic and social crisis that affected the country compromised 
basic human rights, no investment treaty could prevail as it would 
be in violation of such constitutionally recognized rights.119 
However, the tribunal, in upholding Argentina’s BIT obligations, 
concluded: 
In this case, the Tribunal does not find any such collision. First 
because the Constitution carefully protects the right to property, 
just as the treaties on human rights do, and secondly because there 
is no question of affecting fundamental human rights when 
considering the issues disputed by the parties.120 
Thus we see again how an ICSID tribunal found human rights 
obligations while valid, not in conflict with BIT obligations. 
There appear to be only two cases where the investment arbitral 
tribunal expressly dismissed human rights arguments that were before 
it.  The first example, Tradex Hellas S.A. v. Albania, already was 
discussed in Part I(A)(5) above.121  In the UNICTRAL case of 
Biloune v. Ghana Investments Centre, the claimant brought claims 
against Ghana for damages from expropriation, denial of justice and 
the violation of his human rights.122  Ghana allegedly interfered with 
the investments and other activities of both the claimant and the 
Ghanaian corporation of which he was the principal shareholder 
when it arrested and deported him out of Ghana.123  Ghana asserted 
that he was arrested and deported for reasons other than his 
investments there.124  Moreover, Ghana claimed that he had 
participated in the arbitration, and that the tribunal lacked the 
requisite jurisdiction to hear claims of human rights violations.125  As 
 
 118. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Apr. 
25, 2005, 44 I.L.M 1205, 1217, para. 113 (2005) (ICSID (W. Bank)). 
 119. Id. at 1217, para. 114 (internal citations omitted). 
 120. Id. at 1218, para. 121. 
 121. See text accompanying supra notes 73-76. 
 122. See generally Biloune v. Ghana Investments Centre, 95 I.L.R. 183 (UNCITRAL 1989). 
 123. See generally id. 
 124. See id. 
 125. See id. 
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to the claims of human rights violations, the tribunal characterized 
the claimant’s argument as being “that the Government’s allegedly 
arbitrary detention and expulsion of Mr. Biloune and violation of his 
property and contractual rights constitute an actionable human rights 
violation for which compensation may be required in a commercial 
arbitration pursuant to the GIC Agreement,” and the tribunal 
“should consider this portion of the claim because this is the only 
forum in which redress for these alleged injuries may be sought.”126  
While the tribunal saw that international law grants individuals 
fundamental human rights such as property rights and personal rights, 
the tribunal determined that “it does not follow that this Tribunal is 
competent to pass upon every type of departure from the minimum 
standard to which foreign nationals are entitled, or that this Tribunal 
is authorized to deal with allegations of violations of fundamental 
human rights.”127  The tribunal concluded on this point: 
This Tribunal’s competence is limited to commercial disputes 
arising under a contract entered into in the context of Ghana’s 
Investment Code. As noted, the Government agreed to arbitrate 
only disputes “in respect of” the foreign investment. Thus, other 
matters—however compelling the claim or wrongful the alleged 
act—are outside this Tribunal’s jurisdiction. Under the facts of this 
case it must be concluded that, while the acts alleged to violate the 
international human rights of Mr Biloune may be relevant in 
considering the investment dispute under arbitration, this Tribunal 
lacks jurisdiction to address, as an independent cause of action, a 
claim of violation of human rights.128 
Here we see how an arbitral tribunal expressly sidestepped an 
important human rights issue entirely.  Admittedly, arbitral tribunals 
have limited jurisdiction, so that tribunal may have been correct in 
avoiding a pronouncement on the issue.  Still, it is important to keep 
in mind that the tribunal did not reject or somehow denigrate the 
notion of human rights.  On the contrary, the tribunal expressly 
acknowledged that there are fundamental human rights that 
governments are not allowed to violate, and even went so far as to say 
that the claimant’s human rights “may be relevant in considering the 
investment dispute under arbitration,” thus showing that investment 
arbitration supports human rights even when the relevant arbitral 
panels refuse to pronounce upon such rights due to a perceived lack 
of jurisdiction. 
 
 126. Id. at 202-03. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
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This Section has discussed actual cases where international 
arbitral tribunals have dealt with human rights or human rights 
jurisprudence in an effort to show that international arbitration, if 
anything, supports human rights, instead of undermining human 
rights.129  The following Section looks at the logic of international 
investment arbitration to assess how accurate prior studies on 
international arbitration and human rights have been in concluding 
that the former undermines the latter. 
II.  THEORETICAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS 
OBLIGATIONS AND INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 
A. Introduction 
As noted in the introduction above, there are numerous studies 
that indicate that international investment law and arbitration 
negatively impact human rights.  Before addressing their points on 
investment arbitration, four separate points must be made by way of 
introduction.  Admittedly, international investment law, as embodied 
in BITs, gives certain rights to investors without imposing 
corresponding obligations that would absolutely protect human 
rights.130  However, one must not forget that international investment 
law (at least the law coming from BITs) only freezes the human rights 
situation in the host state at the time the BIT was entered into, thus 
making it difficult for the host state to change the situation in its 
 
 129. Passing reference occasionally is made to human rights conventions or human rights 
courts without citing or relying on any of the substantive rights within those conventions or 
decisions of those courts.  For example, in the Pan American Energy (PAE) v. Argentine 
Republic ICSID arbitration, Argentina objected to PAE not using Argentine courts to hear its 
claim based on an estoppel argument where PAE asserted in an earlier case against Forestal 
Santa Bárbara (a Delaware company) that conflicts over hydrocarbon concessions were 
exclusively for Argentine federal courts to decide, and that such matters were governed by the 
U.S.-Argentina BIT, the Washington Convention and the 1969 American Human Rights 
Convention, inter alia.  See Pan American Energy LLC v. Argentine Republic, Decision on 
Preliminary Objections, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/13, 2006 WL 2479770, para. 141 (ICSID (W. 
Bank)). Further, that Argentina relied on this case and this argument in the other cases it has 
faced.  See, e.g., BP America Production Co.. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/04/8, 2006 WL 2479771 (APPAWD), para. 141 (ICSID (W. Bank)). 
 130. See, e.g., Bachand & Rousseau, supra note 3, at 16 (discussing how BITs provide 
investors with the national treatment and MFN status, rules favoring capital transfers, a ban on 
performance requirements, and implementation of dispute settlement mechanisms enabling 
investors to appeal to international arbitration). 
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pursuit of development.131  The situation itself does not deteriorate on 
account of these bilateral agreements.  In fact, the popular principles 
of investment liberalization dictate that developing countries refrain 
from intervening in their own economies as much as possible, even 
when human rights are involved, which itself would limit the ability of 
these states to control their development, with or without the 
strictures imposed by BITs.132  Nonetheless, it might be enough that 
BITs deny states the opportunity to develop in order to denounce 
these agreements, since, as Mary Robinson has stated, “Denial of the 
right to development puts all other rights at risk.”133  At a minimum, 
this Article acknowledges the imbalance between these aspects within 
BITs of giving investors rights without corresponding obligations. 
Still, it is one thing to say that there is an imbalance and quite 
another thing to say that international arbitration undermines human 
rights obligations.  After all, international arbitration as a dispute 
settlement mechanism is based on neutrality and consent of the 
parties, so arbitral tribunals cannot force a state to act in ways that 
were reasonably foreseeable when the state agreed to the BIT.134  As 
David Caron emphasizes, international arbitration, whether inter-
state or private, is “created and defined by the joint will of the 
parties.”135  Even though average individuals—people whose rights 
are supposedly impacted by foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
portfolio investment by foreign investors—do not expressly agree to 
BITs (which often act as the jurisdictional bases for international 
investment disputes), the governments that represent them do, thus 
providing a type of derived consent by the people, though this 
admittedly cannot shield governments from criticisms concerning the 
evolution of the substantive rights of their citizens.136  With 
 
 131. Interestingly, by entering into the BIT, the host state has used its sovereignty to 
relinquish a portion of its sovereignty, so the fact that the state loses some of its options by 
entering into the BIT does not mean that the state’s sovereignty has been denigrated. 
 132. See Bachand & Rousseau, supra note 3, at 3. 
 133. Mary Robinson, Constructing an International Financial, Trade and Development 
Architecture: The Human Rights Dimension, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC 
GLOBALISATION: DIRECTIONS FOR THE WTO 187, 199 (Malini Mehra ed., 1999). 
 134. See, e.g., ALAN REDFERN ET AL., LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 5-13 (4th ed. 2004). 
 135. David D. Caron, The Nature of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and the Evolving 
Structure of International Dispute Resolution, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 104, 109 (1990). 
 136. Interestingly, the European Court of Human Rights made this same point when it 
noted how non-nationals are “more vulnerable to domestic legislation: unlike nationals, they 
will generally have played no part in the election or designation of its authors nor have been 
02__FRY.DOC 5/27/2008  1:27:26 PM 
2007] EVIDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW’S UNITY 105 
“government by consent of the governed,” as proposed by Locke, 
Hobbes, and Rousseau, this metaphoric consent to government is 
forward looking without the electorate knowing what the government 
will actually do with its so-called mandate.137  While states should be 
held responsible for the abuse of their citizens’ rights, investors ought 
not to be held responsible for the myopia (or perhaps even 
negligence) of the host state (and by extension, its own people in 
democratic states) in the context of BITs affecting human rights 
standards, because states expressly agreed to such arrangements.  On 
its surface, international arbitration per se would not seem inclined to 
undermine human rights obligations in a way beyond how host states 
are prepared to undermine them. 
Where international arbitration gets a bad name is from its 
conservative reputation (whether justified or unjustified) of so-called 
splitting the baby between the two parties.138  At the same time, the 
protection of human rights would appear to be an absolute endeavor, 
at least from the perspective of advocates.  Therefore, by its very 
nature, international arbitration is prone to disappointing human 
rights promoters who tend to think in terms of absolutes, whereas 
investors’ rights advocates are far more pragmatic and willing to live 
with compromises that still deliver adequate profits to their clients.  
Human rights advocates might call this a bias away from human 
rights, when in reality international arbitration is not about all-or-
nothing solutions.  This does not mean that arbitrators are unethical 
for refusing to grant the full demands of human rights advocates.  
Rather, they are pragmatic decision-makers who are conscious of the 
complexities that sovereignty adds to any case involving a state.139 
 
consulted on its adoption.”  James v. United Kingdom, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) paras. 50, 63 
(1986). 
 137. See generally THE SOCIAL CONTRACT FROM HOBBES TO RAWLS (David Boucher & 
Paul Kelly eds., 1994). 
 138. See, e.g., Julia A. Martin, Arbitrating in the Alps Rather than Litigating in Los Angeles: 
The Advantages of International Intellectual Property-Specific Alternative Dispute Resolutions, 
49 STAN. L. REV. 917, 955 (1997).  Please note that the Author does not share this opinion that 
international arbitration involves so-called splitting the baby.  Indeed, a recent American 
Arbitration Association (AAA) statistical study would seem to go a long way in dispelling that 
myth.  See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, SPLITTING THE BABY: A NEW AAA 
STUDY (2007), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=32004 (last visited July 13, 2007).  
Nonetheless, this general issue falls outside the scope of this Article. 
 139. See Robert A. Kearney, Arbitral Practice and Purpose in Employee Off-Duty 
Misconduct Cases, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 135, 155-56 (1993) (concluding that arbitrators are 
generally pragmatists). 
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Finally, one must not forget that there likely is a complex, non-
linear relationship between international investment and human 
rights, or rather the denigration of human rights.  For example, when 
the private sector is favored, there gradually will be more FDI flowing 
into that particular host state.  It is no secret that multi-national 
corporations (MNCs) strategically choose their locations of 
investment to take advantage of tax laws, corporation laws and even 
human rights law, among other reasons.  Some commentators assert 
that MNCs have a legal duty to act in this manner in an effort to 
maximize profits however legally possible.140  This increase in 
investments in turn should accelerate development, which helps 
improve human rights for the local population.141  Moreover, as 
human rights are observed in a host state, especially rights dealing 
with education, work conditions and health services, work force 
productivity likely will improve, thus making investor promotion of 
human rights a sound business strategy.  Raising this point is not to 
endorse a type of human rights protection through human rights 
violation, but is merely to highlight the oft forgotten human rights 
advantages that can flow from foreign direct investment in developing 
countries.  While some commentators point out that there is little 
evidence to show that BITs stimulate FDI,142 one must not neglect the 
possibility that international investment law and human rights 
effectively can complement each other. 
 
 140. See JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND 
POWER 60-84 (2004); Laura Spitz, The Gift of Enron: An Opportunity to Talk About Capitalism, 
Equality, Globalization, and the Promise of a North-American Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
66 OHIO ST. L.J. 315, 367 n.214 (2005). 
 141. High Commissioner Report, supra note 1, ¶¶ 8, 24-25.  See also Michael Hart, A 
Multilateral Agreement on Foreign Direct Investment: Why Now?, in INVESTMENT RULES FOR 
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 36, 43 (Pierre Sauve & Daniel Schwanen, eds., 1996) (giving such 
examples as job creation, the availability of development capital, the transfer of needed 
technology, and increased exports and tax revenue); Peter Prove, Human Rights at the World 
Trade Organization?, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC GLOBALISATION, supra note 133, at 
23, 26-27 (making these same arguments though more in the context of trade generally).  
However, these perceived benefits from FDI probably should not be taken as a given, nor 
should the possibility that MNCs involved in FDI can be involved in human rights violations.  
See, e.g., Peter T. Muchlinkski, Human Rights and Multinationals: Is There a Problem?, 77 INT’L 
AFF. 31 (2001).  That said, these points are not directly related to the thesis here, and so are left 
for future publications. 
 142. See Suda, supra note 2, at 2 (citing MARY HALLWARD-DRIEMEIER, WORLD BANK, DO 
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES ATTRACT FDI? 22-23 (2003)). 
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B. Arguments for How Human Rights Ought to be Considered 
This Section analyzes the feasibility of some of the normative 
arguments that commentators have made in arguing that arbitral 
tribunals must take human rights obligations into consideration when 
determining BIT obligations.  Please note that this Section is not 
intended to be a mere literature review or to offend those that have 
suggested these changes.  Rather, this Section is aimed at supporting 
the notion that international arbitration does not necessarily have to 
change, and instead prefers placing the burden squarely on states to 
take greater care in protecting the rights of their citizens, which is the 
founding principle underlying the entire field of human rights. 
One normative argument that is worth mentioning in this brief 
introduction involves the U.N. High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, which relied in 2003 on the fact that individuals currently have 
no mechanism for lodging complaints against states for human rights 
violations dealing with economic, social and cultural rights. It, then, 
concluded that this is the reason why arbitral tribunals ought to 
consider such rights when making their decisions, thus enabling 
individuals and communities to have a voice in cases where investor 
interests and human rights appear to conflict.143  This essentially is 
what the claimant argued in the UNCITRAL case Biloune v. Ghana 
Investments Centre.144  Unfortunately, nothing in international law 
obliges arbitral tribunals to take into account such considerations 
when making their decisions, assuming these rights have not risen to 
the level of jus cogens norms.  To the contrary, such arbitral tribunals 
are of limited jurisdiction as provided by the arbitration clause in the 
underlying instruments of the dispute,145 though this is not to say that 
the scope of applicable law for these tribunals is limited in 
interpreting and applying the relevant arbitration clauses and laws.146  
It is fine to wish that arbitrators would use their discretion to reach 
certain conclusions, but this Article prefers to talk in terms of rights, 
duties and obligations when allocating blame or even responsibility. 
1. States Could Raise Human Rights Obligations.  Admittedly, 
states could raise human rights obligations in their pleadings before 
arbitral tribunals to help them consider such points, as the UN High 
 
 143. See High Commissioner Report, supra note 1, ¶¶ 41, 54-55. 
 144. See text accompanying supra notes 122-28. 
 145. See REDFERN ET AL., supra note 134, at 255. 
 146. See infra text accompanying note 318. 
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Commissioner for Human Rights encourages.147  Indeed, such a 
practice likely would jumpstart the interconnectedness of 
international arbitration and human rights.  However, as litigants 
often include an overabundance of arguments to support their 
position (either out of necessity or strategic planning), that states 
currently do not seem to make such arguments could be interpreted 
as meaning that they have strong incentives not to do so.  Such 
incentives might be to avoid the negative repercussions that could 
result from investors pulling their investments in the host state and 
future investors deciding to invest in other states that do not place 
human rights obligations over the interests of investors.  Even if states 
chose to include such arguments in their pleadings, there are no 
guarantees that tribunals will “take into account the wider legal and 
social context,”148 thus providing an additional (perhaps even 
insurmountable) hurdle to states in relying on such human rights 
obligations to defend against expropriation claims.  Indeed, high 
financial risks coupled with no guarantees of human rights arguments 
being considered by the tribunal make for quite a predictable 
incentive calculation. 
Still, some commentators push for arbitral tribunals to take 
human rights obligations into account when reaching their decisions.  
At least one commentator has relied on Article 42(1) of the ICSID 
Convention to claim that “[i]n many cases, then, international law will 
be applicable to investment disputes to some extent, and in disputes 
where that is the case, arbitral tribunals may have the opportunity to 
consider international human rights obligations of states.”149  Article 
42(1) of the ICSID Convention reads: 
The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of 
law as may be agreed by the parties.  In the absence of such 
agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting 
State party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) 
and such rules of international law as may be applicable.150 
 
 147. See High Commissioner Report, supra note 1, ¶ 55. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See Suda, supra note 2, at 66; Peterson & Gray, supra note 4, at 11. 
 150. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of 
Other States art. 42(1), Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 1286, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hearinafter 
ICSID Convention] (entered into force Oct. 14, 1966); NAFTA Article 1131 has a similar 
provision that tribunals can decide disputes before them “in accordance with this Agreement 
and applicable rules of international law.”  North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., art 1131, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993). 
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The qualifier “may” in the commentator’s statement above seems like 
a slight overstatement, especially when international law is designated 
as a somewhat supplementary source of applicable law under the 
ICSID Convention.  Moreover, human rights might exist in general 
international law only where they have reached the level of custom, 
assuming no particular human rights treaty language is applicable to 
the particular case.  According to Section 702 of the Restatement 
(Third) on Foreign Relations Law of the United States, such 
customary human rights are limited to genocide, slavery or slave 
trade, the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals, torture 
or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
prolonged arbitrary detention, systematic racial discrimination, or a 
consistent patter of gross violations of internationally recognized 
human rights.151  While this is a conservative list of customary human 
rights norms, the actual list likely does not necessarily include the 
type of second-generation human rights that deal with social, 
economic and cultural rights that would be implicated in an 
investment dispute.  Moreover, while some commentators might 
claim that BITs are derogations from customary international law 
standards152—which conceivably could include human rights 
customary norms—states generally cannot derogate from human 
rights norms through the use of contract and treaties.153  In short, it 
would seem unlikely that states will raise human rights obligations in 
response to allegations of investment treaty violations, or that 
tribunals will raise human rights obligations sua sponte when reaching 
their decisions. 
2. Allowing NGOs to Bring Arbitration Proceedings.  Some 
commentators posit that human rights situations throughout the 
world might improve if NGOs were given the ability to bring 
arbitration proceedings against corrupt host states for diverting 
humanitarian resources.154  However, even these commentators seem 
 
 151. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ON FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 
(1987). 
 152. See Paul Peters, Investment Risk and Trust: The Role of International Law, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 131, 153 (Paul de Waart et al. eds., 1988). 
 153. See generally Ontario  v. Etobicoke, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 202 (Can.); See also John-Paul 
Alexandrowicz, A Comparative Analysis of the Law Regulating Employment Arbitration 
Agreements in the United States and Canada, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 1007, 1038-39 (2002). 
 154. See generally Gregory W. MacKenzie, ICSID Arbitration as a Strategy for Levelling the 
Playing Field Between International Non-Governmental Organizations and Host States, 19 
SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 197 (1993). 
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to acknowledge that this argument is largely hypothetical inasmuch as 
NGOs typically do not have arbitration clauses in their agreements 
with host states, and NGOs have little leverage in negotiating greater 
rights in these agreements.155  While there might be considerable 
benefits to involving NGOs in the manner proposed, they have no 
standing to bring claims under the current approach to drafting BITs 
since BITs typically give investors of one state the ability to bring 
investment-related claims against the other state, and neither NGOs 
nor their disputes would be covered.156  Gregory MacKenzie appears 
to assume that arbitration is the only option for NGOs to pursue their 
concerns with host states.157  However, arbitration is not an option 
unless the host state consents to this, which generally has not been the 
case. 
3. Allowing Individuals to Sue Investors for Human Rights 
Violations.  Still other commentators devote entire articles to 
asserting that future BITs ought to include language that allows 
nationals of the host state to sue investors for alleged human rights 
violations.158  Weiler explains his goal in proposing such changes to 
BITs: 
By grafting a human rights claim mechanism onto the existing 
structure of international investment protection treaties, one can 
both recognize the growing place of the transnational corporation 
in human rights law and practice and improve upon the Achilles 
heel of human rights— effective enforcement.159 
Admittedly, if an investor had a sufficient degree of bargaining 
power, as Ian Eliasoph points out, then the investor could negotiate 
the inclusion of various human rights standards, including labor 
standards, within the obligations that an arbitrator would then have 
 
 155. See id. at 217 (noting how CARE’s agreements with host states require merely 
negotiation in cases of disputes and that their bargaining position vis-à-vis host states is 
inherently unequal). 
 156. See, e.g., 2004 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 1., 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38710.pdf (defining “claimant” as “an investor of 
a Party that is a party to an investment dispute with the other Party”). 
 157. See MacKenzie, supra note 154, at 217-18 (asserting that “aside from state espousal of 
the international agency’s claim which appears to be impractical, the international agency is 
limited to arbitration to settle its claim against a host state”). 
 158. See generally Todd Weiler, Balancing Human Rights and Investor Protection: A New 
Approach for a Different Legal Order, 27 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 429 (2004). 
 159. Id. at 450. 
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to address if such provisions were alleged to have been violated.160  
Then the powerful enforcement regime of the New York Convention 
could be useful in enforcing human rights obligations.161  The one 
problem with this hypothetical situation is that investors have little 
incentive to include human rights standards that would then open 
them up to potential liability or at least a certain amount of risk, 
assuming they have not yet internalized the point about the 
promotion of human rights being a wise business strategy. 
Without entirely discounting this possibility, international 
investment arbitration seems like an inappropriate forum in which to 
sue for respect for human rights standards, especially given that there 
currently exist supervision mechanisms that allow for adjudication of 
certain human rights concerns.162  As Peterson and Gray indicate: 
[T]he inclusion of investor responsibilities in investment treaties[] 
would necessarily require that investment tribunals grapple more 
frequently and at an ever-greater level of sophistication with 
human rights norms.  This presupposes ever-greater human rights 
expertise on the part of arbitrators, and invests these Tribunals with 
greater authority as fora where human rights concerns will be 
elaborated and interpreted.  It must be stressed that investment 
tribunals would not become an adjudicative forum for human rights 
norms.  Rather, they would only adjudicate investor rights, but in a 
manner which conditioned these investor rights on compliance of 
the investors with minimum human rights responsibilities.  
Naturally, it should be asked whether these ad-hoc Tribunals can 
be expected to have the legitimacy to be entrusted with such a 
critical task.163 
Indeed, while there are several eminent arbitrators who are equally 
competent in working with human rights law, such as ICJ Judges 
Rosalyn Higgins and Thomas Buergenthal as well as Cambridge 
Professor James Crawford and HEI Professors Lucius Caflisch and 
Brigitte Stern,164 investment arbitrators in general come from the 
private international law sphere that relies on distinct skills and 
philosophies from those in the public international law sphere.  While 
 
 160. See Ian H. Eliasoph, Missing Link: International Arbitration and the Ability of Private 
Actors to Enforce Human Rights Norms, 10 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 83, 106-08 (2004). 
 161. See id. 
 162. See Peterson & Gray, supra note 4, at 35-36; Suda, supra note 2, at 92. 
 163. Peterson & Gray, supra note 4, at 36. 
 164. See, e.g., Rosalyn Higgins, President, Int’l Ct. of Justice, The International Court of 
Justice and Some Private International Law Thoughts, HEI Lalive Lecture (July 8, 2007) (notes 
on file with the author).  But see J.G. WETTER, 1 THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL PROCESS - 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 12 (1979) (explaining why public and private international law arbitrators 
do not share the same skills). 
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it is highly likely that arbitrators would spend the requisite time and 
energy to become well versed in human rights law when faced with 
such issues, such an arrangement certainly is less than ideal in light of 
the overwhelming importance of human rights to the people involved.  
That said, solutions need not be ideal if they are actual solutions to a 
problem. 
4. Modifying Investment Law to Provide More Economic 
Development.  Some commentators assert that BITs do not even 
encourage investment in host states.  Peterson and Gray assert: 
[A]s treaties continue to proliferate, they have not been matched 
by evidence that they contribute to enhanced flows of investment. 
Indeed, a recent report of the World Bank is the latest to point to 
the lack of correlation between investment flows and the 
conclusion of these treaties.  Given that the standard rationale for 
the creation and extension of such investor rights has not stood the 
test of time, it stands to reason that states might wish to consider 
new rationales for negotiating investment protection treaties.165 
If this is, indeed, the case, one is left to wonder whether the 
investment regime can be modified to place more emphasis on such 
human rights as the right to economic development, if not other 
rights.  The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in 2003, 
Sergio Vieira de Mello, seemed to think this was possible when he 
called for a “human rights approach to investment liberalization,”166 
and quite a few commentators agreed with that sentiment.167  What 
seems particularly unfair is that BITs give investors rights without any 
particular responsibilities.168  It certainly is not a crime for investors to 
want the best deal possible.  In fact, as already mentioned, multi-
national corporations may be under a duty to their shareholders to 
seek the best terms for their investments.169  However, a public good 
seems to be involved here that the market does not adequately 
provide protection for human rights considerations in the host state.  
As Weiler argues, the investment regime ought to change in order to 
take care of this negative externality.  In the end, investors hopefully 
will realize that encouraging observance of human rights obligations 
will increase returns on their investments, as the host state’s labor 
 
 165. Peterson & Gray, supra note 4, at 35-36. 
 166. High Commissioner Report, supra note 1, ¶ 56. 
 167. See Suda, supra note 2, at 92-93; Peterson & Gray, supra note 4, at 29-30; Bachand & 
Rousseau, supra note 3, at 33-34. 
 168. Suda, supra note 2, at 97; see Peterson & Gray, supra note 4, at 35. 
 169. See supra text accompanying note 142. 
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force becomes healthier, better educated, and possibly even future 
clients of the investors, not to mention improve the investors’ public 
relations and overall image.170 
5. Improving the Precision of Investment Law.  Finally, some 
commentators say that investment agreements impact human rights 
because investors use them to bypass the normal legal channels and 
domestic laws that were enacted to protect the rights of individuals.  
They assert that this can and should be fixed by improving the 
precision of such agreements by limiting the application of investor 
protections in favor of human rights considerations.171  However, this 
precision will make the host state appear less favorable to investors, 
thus defeating the purpose of developing states agreeing to BITs, so 
any such limitation on investor protection likely will have an adverse 
impact on investment.  This, in itself, can also have an adverse impact 
on human rights, since investment helps with the economic 
development of the host state.172  Whether the state can actually get 
such limited protection will depend on that state’s bargaining position 
vis-à-vis its counterpart—for example, if it has particularly rare 
resources or is in an ideal strategic position. 
Again, no disrespect is intended by pointing out some of the 
practical and theoretical difficulties with these suggestions.  Many of 
these proposals certainly could improve the human rights situation in 
the world, and the descriptive arguments provided here do little in 
adequately rebutting their normative arguments.  Still, care should be 
taken so as not to shift the burden entirely onto the shoulders of the 
international arbitration regime, thus relieving states of their 
responsibilities. 
C. Perceived Problems with Investment Arbitration and Human 
Rights 
Commentators cite three aspects of international investment 
arbitration that have a negative impact on the human rights situation 
in host states: a lack of transparency, a lack of legitimacy and a lack of 
accountability.  Each makes it harder for the host state to regulate its 
 
 170. See generally Suda, supra note 2, at 102 n.421 (talking about how “strong human rights 
enforcement and other forms of public interest regulation may in fact enhance rather than 
decrease business profitability”). 
 171. See, e.g., Gus Van Harten, Guatemala’s Peace Accords in a Free Trade Area of the 
Americas, 3 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 113, 157-58 (2000). 
 172. See supra text accompanying note 143. 
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internal activities and favors the interests of investors.173  This Section 
explores how the impact of each might not necessarily be negative for 
human rights. 
1. Transparency.  Proceeding from the most likely to impact 
human rights to the least likely, this Section begins with the perceived 
lack of transparency in international investment arbitration.  As the 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights asserted in 2003, 
Transparency is essential for the realization of human rights as it 
promotes access to information concerning the allocation of 
resources in the context of progressively realizing economic, social 
and cultural rights, including the right to water.  Such information is 
essential for effective public action and monitoring of both the 
public and private sector.174 
It would seem that few would argue against the importance of 
transparency in promoting the rule of law generally. 
The question, rather, is whether international arbitration 
provides for adequate transparency.  Investment treaty dispute 
settlement is known for its opacity.175  Nonetheless, numerous 
arbitration institutions provide for some transparency.  For example, 
ICSID publicly registers many of the details of the disputes before its 
panels as well as many decisions, even though Article 48(5) of the 
ICSID Convention requires the consent of the parties for an award to 
be published.176  The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal publishes all 
of its decisions, not only in hard copy but on the electronically 
searchable database Westlaw, which has had a tremendous impact on 
the development of international investment law.  Arbitrations under 
other procedures, however, allow for publication of dispute details 
much more sporadically, if at all.177  This might be changing, though, 
even if the published version is somewhat sanitized.178 
 
 173. See Suda, supra note 2, at 5, 47-52. 
 174. High Commissioner Report, supra note 1, ¶ 28. 
 175. See Peterson & Gray, supra note 4, at 15, 34. 
 176. See ICSID Convention, supra note 150, at 1288, 575 U.N.T.S. at 188. 
 177. See Peterson & Gray, supra note 4, at 10 (noting how the ICC, the Stockholm Chamber 
of Commerce and UNCITRAL all lack a requirement to publicize arbitration proceedings); 
Eric Gottwald, Leveling the Playing Field: Is it Time for a Legal Assistance Center for 
Developing Nations in Investment Treaty Arbitration?, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 237, 256-57 
(2007) (pointing out how many arbitration rules require that parties give their consent before an 
award is published). 
 178. See Hans Smit, Breach of Confidentiality as a Ground for Avoidance of the Arbitration 
Agreement, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 567, 579 (2000) (asserting that the ICC and AAA have 
been expanding publication of their awards in recent years); Gu Weixia, Confidentiality 
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Transparency is a problem for investment arbitration because 
arbitral awards often are kept confidential.  States generally do not 
know, therefore, the substantive rules of international investment law 
that an arbitral tribunal will apply in the future.  Thus, there is a likely 
chill on the regulatory activities of states that fear that they will be 
sued for any regulatory activity whatsoever, regardless of whether or 
not the BIT has a stabilization clause.179  As Peterson and Gray point 
out: 
Confusion as to the boundaries of acceptable government 
regulation in this realm prevails at a worrying time, as there is clear 
evidence that investors have awakened to the existence of the full 
constellation of international investment treaties and are 
challenging host state laws in record numbers.180 
That said, investors do not know the current standards used in 
investment arbitration, either, as those standards are not made public.  
However, investors’ incentive structures make it so that they have 
more to gain and less to lose than host states, and so the uncertainty 
affects the state to a greater degree.  Please note, however, that the 
perceived secrecy itself (or the difficulty in getting the decisions for 
known awards) does not necessarily “skew the playing field” in favor 
of investors, as some commentators assert,181 as investors and states 
face the same hurdles in gaining access to key awards in crafting their 
cases.182 
2. Legitimacy.  Some commentators assert that investment 
arbitration’s perceived lack of legitimacy affects human rights.183  
Admittedly, the international arbitration community is relatively 
small and connected, leading to the occasional conflict of interests, 
and arbitrators do not all have the same qualifications.  However, this 
 
Revisited: Blessing or Curse in International Commercial Arbitration?, 15 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 
607, 632-33 (2004). 
 179. See Paul E. Comeaux & N. Stephan Kinsella, Reducing Political Risk in Developing 
Countries: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Stabilization Clauses, and MIGA & OPIC Investment 
Insurance, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 30-31 (1994) (discussing the affects of 
stabilization clauses on states implementing human rights obligations). 
 180. Peterson & Gray, supra note 4, at 134. 
 181. See Suda, supra note 2, at 48 (asserting that “[t]he secrecy enshrouding arbitral awards 
under BIT’s ‘contributes to a skewed playing field’”). 
 182. One ought not to assume that investors have greater access to awards through their 
representation by major law firms, which tend to have relatively high access to awards through 
the gradual accumulation of relevant practice, because governments can and often are 
represented by major law firms as well. 
 183. See Suda, supra note 2, at 49-50. 
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does not necessarily translate into host states being put at a 
disadvantage vis-à-vis investors to the point that their capacity to 
implement human rights obligations is diminished.  On the contrary, 
these characteristics of arbitration could be an advantage to either 
side, depending on the arbitrator and the issues. 
Legitimacy ought not to be seen as a simple concept that merely 
involves a tribunal’s justification of authority, as Daniel Bodansky 
might define it.184  Rather, legitimacy is multifaceted and involves a 
host of factors.  As Thomas M. Franck sees it, legitimacy must be 
“firmly rooted in a framework of formal requirements” in order for a 
system of rules to have the fairness that society expects.185  For him, 
the requirements for legitimacy include determinacy, symbolic 
validation, coherence and adherence.186  Justification of authority 
might be included under the element of symbolic validation, whereas 
the others open up the definition of legitimacy considerably.  Further, 
the level of participation of the parties in a dispute and the quality of 
their communications can determine legitimacy,187 in addition to the 
tribunal’s justification of authority.  Such participation often derives 
from the consent of the parties to that process.188  With arbitration’s 
central tenets being party consent and participation, arbitration 
would appear to have other characteristics that support its overall 
legitimacy, in theory, even if the occasional tribunal might have less-
than-impeccable impartiality.  As Franck’s voluminous writings 
indicate, the concept of legitimacy is intricate, and it would be outside 
the scope of this Article to defend the overall legitimacy of 
international arbitration here.  Nonetheless, commentators should 
hesitate before castigating, on grounds of illegitimacy, such a dispute 
 
 184. See Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming 
Challenge for International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 596, 600-01 (1999). 
 185. THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 8 (1995) 
(emphasis added). 
 186. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 49 (1990).  
Please note that citing Franck’s four components of legitimacy here does not necessarily mean 
that this Article supports the idea that there are only four components.  The Article rather 
believes that there are many relevant components to legitimacy. 
 187. See JURGEN HABERMAS, COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 178-79 
(Thomas McCarthy trans.,  1979). 
 188. See Robin Stryker, Rules, Resources, and Legitimacy Processes: Some Implications for 
Social Conflict, Order, and Change, 99 AM. J. SOC. 847, 856-58 (1994) (listing several aspects of 
legitimacy). 
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settlement mechanism (and the law it interprets) that prides itself on 
its fairness of process.189 
3. Accountability.  Just as with the issues concerning legitimacy, 
it is not entirely clear that investment arbitration’s perceived lack of 
accountability affects human rights.  Suda asserts that “contributing 
to the legal uncertainty of investor-state arbitrations under BITs are 
the lack of a consistent and binding body of precedent and the 
variances of review possibilities among the arbitral mechanisms.”190  
First, it must be noted that the link between accountability and 
predictability seems somewhat counter-intuitive.  A link is possible 
inasmuch as prior cases make it possible to measure the arbitral 
tribunal at hand against the average (or reasonable) arbitral tribunal 
in handling a particular issue, assuming these decisions are accessible. 
Assuming there is a valid link, it does not necessarily mean that 
arbitral tribunals are any less accountable than many domestic courts 
for not having binding precedent or the principle of stare decisis.  
After all, states with a civil law system do not have a binding body of 
precedent, though admittedly many do have elements that resemble 
stare decisis.191  Even the body of precedent in states with a common 
law system is inconsistent due to the art of distinguishing cases.  
Moreover, the level of review of decisions varies between states and 
even within states (at least with federal states).  While these factors 
lead to uncertainty, it is not particularly different from that 
uncertainty in domestic litigation or even in other international 
adjudicative bodies, nor is the uncertainty different for the different 
parties to an arbitration proceeding. 
The difference lies in the relative costs to the parties from these 
uncertainties.  The costs are primarily the costs of bringing and 
defending a case, as well as the magnitude of the award.  The larger 
the number of investors in a state makes the potential costs to that 
state significantly higher in defending against a host of complaints 
than the costs of defending such a case against any one investor.  This 
greater cost for states derives from the inefficiencies of arbitration, 
 
 189. See, e.g., Catherine A. Rogers, The Vocation of the International Arbitrator, 20 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 957, 985 (2005). 
 190. Suda, supra note 2, at 50. 
 191. See Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity, or Excuse?, 23 
ARB. INT’L 357 (2007). 
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including norequirement to consolidate related cases.192  Suda would 
appear to lump the inefficiencies of arbitration into accountability,193 
which seems incorrect.  These inefficiencies have the second greatest 
impact on human rights because the costs to states of greater 
litigation magnifies the regulatory chill, thus discouraging states from 
regulating in any way that might raise concerns for investors. 
Finally, while arbitral awards are subject to limited reviews, this 
does not necessarily mean that human rights suffer on account of this 
limitation.  With institutional arbitration, arbitrators are effectively 
held accountable when the institution reviews the award to ensure its 
enforceability in domestic courts, as the ICC International Court of 
Arbitration does.194  With most types of investment arbitration, 
enforcing courts themselves review awards for compliance with the 
seven bases for refusal to recognize and enforce under Article 5 of the 
New York Convention: 
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at 
the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that 
party furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition 
and enforcement is sought, proof that: 
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, 
under the law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the 
said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have 
subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the 
country where the award was made; or 
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given 
proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the 
arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; 
or 
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not 
falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it 
contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission 
to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted 
to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that 
 
 192. See generally Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler et al., Consolidation of Proceedings in 
Investment Arbitration: How Can Multiple Proceedings Arising from the Same or Related 
Situations be Handled Efficiently?, 21 ICSID REVIEW 59 (2006). 
 193. See Suda, supra note 2, at 50-51. 
 194. ICC International Court of Arbitration, Rules of Arbitration, art. 27, Jan. 1, 1998, 
http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/Court/Arbitration/other/rules_arb_english.pdf (“Before 
signing any Award, the Arbitral Tribunal shall submit it in draft form to the Court.  The Court 
may lay down modifications as to the form of the Award and, without affecting the Arbitral 
Tribunal’s liberty of decision, may also draw its attention to points of substance.  No Award 
shall be rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal until it has been approved by the Court as to its 
form.”). 
02__FRY.DOC 5/27/2008  1:27:26 PM 
2007] EVIDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW’S UNITY 119 
part of the award which contains decisions on matters submitted to 
arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or 
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral 
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, 
or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of 
the country where the arbitration took place; or 
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has 
been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the 
country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made. 
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be 
refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition 
and enforcement is sought finds that: 
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement 
by arbitration under the law of that country; or 
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary 
to the public policy of that country.195 
The fact that there is a high rate of enforcement of awards under the 
New York Convention does not mean that the awards have not been 
reviewed by domestic courts.  As for their precedential value, no 
awards are binding on another tribunal given the absence of the 
principle of stare decisis on the international level, but neither are 
judicial cases in civil law systems or within international tribunals, yet 
this characteristic in itself does not necessarily make these courts and 
tribunals unaccountable.  On the contrary, the principle of 
accountability has many different facets, most of which do not depend 
on the following of precedent.196 
Some commentators see international arbitration as inherently 
skewed in favor of investors because arbitrators usually lack the 
expertise to fully take into consideration issues of public interest.197  
However, as shown in Part I, arbitrators have shown a surprising 
willingness and ability to take into consideration decisions from 
 
 195. See U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
art. 5, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.  The main exception where courts do 
not review investment arbitral awards in light of New York Convention Article V is with ICSID 
awards.  See generally Edward Baldwin et al., Limits to Enforcement of ICSID Awards, 23 J. 
INT’L ARB. 1 (2006). 
 196. See generally Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Democracy, Accountability and 
Global Governance (Harvard Univ. John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Politics Research Group 
Working Papers on Int’l Relations No. 01-4, 2001) (discussing the different types of 
accountability). 
 197. See Suda, supra note 2, at 15 (citing RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, 
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 17 (1995)). 
02__FRY.DOC 5/27/2008  1:27:26 PM 
120 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 18:77 
human rights tribunals.  Ultimately, this perceived bias, therefore, is 
likely not as strong as these commentators suggest. 
This Part has attempted to rebut many of the assertions that 
commentators have made concerning the negative impact that 
international investment arbitration has had on human rights.  Part I 
laid out the various ways in which international investment arbitral 
tribunals have relied on human rights in reaching their decisions, in 
an effort to support the thesis that international arbitration actually 
supports human rights.  Indeed, the UN Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights declared that human 
rights have “centrality and primacy . . . in all areas of governance and 
development, including . . . investment and financial policies . . . .”198  
Although the cases in Part I might not demonstrate “centrality and 
primacy” of human rights within investment arbitration, these cases 
do support the underlying premise (and thesis of this Article) that 
one specialized body of law—human rights law—impacts another 
specialized body—international arbitration.  Such a notion is relevant 
to the debate surrounding the fragmentation of international law.  In 
particular, the arguments made in Parts I and II above undermine 
several of the key assertions that commentators within the 
fragmentation-camp make,199 and thus supports the theory that there 
are unifying forces within international law that ought not to be 
ignored. 
III.  THE UNITY OR  
FRAGMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW? 
Having looked at the specific arbitration cases that rely on 
human rights jurisprudence, this Part explains the theoretical debate 
between whether unity or fragmentation better characterizes the field 
of international law, since this debate appears to influence  the studies 
mentioned in the Introduction when they assume that these two 
specialized bodies of international law are incompatible.  Beyond 
helping respond to these studies, an understanding of this debate is 
important because the analysis provided in Part I impacts this debate 
as it shows how the two specialized regimes are able to coexist and 
even intermingle to some degree.  This conclusion suggests that 
 
 198. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Prevention of 
Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Human Hights as the Primary Objective of Trade, 
Investment and Financial Policy, pmbl. ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/12 (Aug. 20, 1998). 
 199. This assumes one accepts the accurancy of those arguments, which is not a given. 
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international law, at least, is not as hyper-fragmented as some 
commentators assert, nor is the unity of international law merely a 
construct of legal scientists.  Moreover, this Part responds to some of 
the assertions made by the Study Group of the International Law 
Commission (ILC) on the Fragmentation of International Law, which 
generalized in its consolidated report that specialized bodies of law 
such as human rights law and “such exotic and highly specialized 
knowledges as ‘investment law’ . . . each possessing their own 
principles and institutions . . . [show] relative ignorance of legislative 
and institutional activities in the adjoining fields.”200  However, as the 
preceding portions of this Article have demonstrated, a close study of 
international arbitral decisions indicates that arbitral panels have 
borrowed on numerous occasions from human rights law and 
otherwise have shown how they are not entirely ignorant of the 
activities there.201 
So that the key terms are clear, Martti Koskenniemi recently 
defined fragmentation as “the breakdown of the substance of general 
international law into allegedly autonomous, functionally oriented, 
‘self-contained’ regimes.”202  Self-contained regimes are seen as being 
 
 200. Int’l Law Comm’n, 58th Session, Report of the Study Group of the International Law 
Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification 
and Expansion of International Law, ¶ 8, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) [hereinafter 
Consolidated Report] (finalized by Martti Koskenniemi).  See also Int’l Law Comm’n, 58th 
Session, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, Fragmentation of 
International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.702 (July 18, 2006) [hereinafter ILC 
58th Session Report]. 
 201. It is not unusual for arbitral tribunals to be required to consider multiple bodies of law 
at the same time.  For example, the arbitral tribunal in the OSPAR/Mox Plant arbitration had to 
consider the law under the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the 
North-East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention), the European Community and Euratom Treaties, 
the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, and relevant custom and general principles of law, 
though the tribunal did not apply the Rio Declartion or the 2001 Aarhus Convention on the 
Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making, and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters because it deemed these to be merely emerging international law.  See 
generally Dispute Concerning Access to Information Under Article 9 of the OSPAR 
Convention (Ir. v. U.K.), 42 I.L.M. 1118 (2003) (Perm. Ct. Arb.).  See also Consolidated Report, 
supra note 200, ¶¶ 439-42.  What makes the cases discussed in Part I special is that these 
tribunals rely on human rights law usually without human rights law being directly implicated in 
the dispute.  For example, even though the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion dealt 
with a host of specialized bodies of international law, such as human rights law, humanitarian 
law, environmental law and the law of the use of force, all of these had been invoked.  See id. ¶ 
118. 
 202. Martti Koskenniemi, Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes 
About International Law and Globalization, 8 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 9, 18 (2007) [hereinafter 
Koskenniemi, Mindset]; Martin Koskenniemi & Paivi Leino, Fragmentation of International 
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autopoietic regimes in that “autonomic” and “autopoietic” mean self-
governing or self-maintaining, respectively.  “Unity” here is defined 
as the absence of fragmentation.  Please keep in mind that entire 
conferences of the most eminent scholars have been devoted to this 
topic on numerous occasions,203 so the goal cannot be to resolve this 
debate in a relatively short article such as the one here.  Rather, this 
Study’s goal is far more humble in sketching out the competing sides 
to the debate and some of the history of the ILC’s work on 
fragmentation.  The Article then strives to look at how international 
arbitration interacts with human rights law in a way that avoids 
noticeable conflicts. 
Three disclaimers are appropriate for this Part.  First, the limited 
number of cases where arbitral tribunals rely on human rights 
jurisprudence does not allow one to conclude definitely that these 
fields are inextricably linked or even that human rights courts rely on 
international arbitral decisions.204  Second, the narrow scope of this 
Article and the qualitative methodology limit its ability to conclude 
whether all specialized bodies of international law are intermingling 
or have sufficiently common rules to constitute a coherent legal 
 
Law: Postmodern Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 553, 560-61 (2002) [hereinafter Koskenniemi 
& Leino] (providing a definition of “self-contained” that emphasizes a legal regime’s “operation 
outside general international law” and de-emphasizes compartmentalization of legal regimes, 
though they seem to contradict themselves when they later talk of “fully self-contained regimes” 
being less of a threat than semi-autonomous regimes). 
 203. See generally 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 679-933 (1999); 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 845-1375 
(2004); UNITY AND DIVERSITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 12; DIVERSITY IN 
SECONDARY RULES AND THE UNITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (L.A.N.M. Barnhoorn & K.C. 
Wellens eds., 1995). 
 204. That said, it must be noted that some human rights courts have shown a willingness to 
rely on other bodies of law in reaching their decisions.  The European Court of Human Rights 
has said on numerous occasions that it cannot interpret and apply the European Convention on 
Human Rights in a vacuum.  See Consolidated Report, supra note 200, at 85-87 (quoting 
McElhinney v. Ireland, App. No. 31253/96, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 37, para. 36; Bankovi v. 
Belgium et al., App. No. 52207/99, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 335, para. 57) (discussing the 
application of general international law by special regimes, though such declarations might be 
relevant when discussing how special regimes can apply norms from other special regimes).  See 
also Hélène Ruiz Fabri, The Approach Taken by the European Court of Human Rights to the 
Assessment of Compensation for ‘Regulatory Expropriations’ of the Property of Foreign 
Investors, 11 N.Y.U. ENVT’L. L.J. 148, 160-63 (2002) (asserting that the European Court of 
Human Rights has had a role in the promotion of general principles of international law); Beate 
Rudolf, Unity and Diversity of International Law in the Settlement of International Disputes, in 
UNITY AND DIVERSITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 12, at 390 (discussing how 
different international judicial bodies refer to each other); Monika Heymann, Unity and 
Diversity with Regard to International Treaty Law, in UNITY AND DIVERSITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 12, at 236 (stating that “treaty bodies refer to conventions 
relating to other subject matters while interpreting a treaty”). 
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system.205  Finally, this Article puts aside the debate over whether 
human rights are universal or more regional (which conceivably could 
relate to the issue of international law’s unity),206 because this Article 
is more interested in the interaction of different bodies of law and not 
the consistency of any one body throughout the world in different 
cultures.207  The possibility exists that the field of human rights is an 
extra-special type of specialized regime that impacts all aspects of 
international law, and should not be seen as just another specialized 
body of law that other specialized bodies might use to reinterpret 
their own rules in its light, but is one that requires other specialized 
bodies to be reinterpreted in its light.208  If that is the case, then the 
interaction between human rights and international arbitration might 
not be applicable to the interaction between other specialized bodies 
of international law, thus further limiting the types of generalizations 
that can be drawn in the broader unification-versus-fragmentation 
debate.  The existence of such an influential specialized body of 
international law itself, however, is more likely prime evidence of 
international law’s unity, supporting the general thesis of this Article. 
A. The ILC’s Study on the Fragmentation of International Law 
1. Underlying Negativity.  There are myriad angles from which 
one can look at the unification-versus-fragmentation debate, each 
 
 205. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, CONCEPT OF LAW 113 (1961).  Such issues are reserved for 
future research. 
 206. See generally NOWAK, supra note 13, at 1-72; Dianne Otto, Rethinking the 
“Universality” of Human Rights Law, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (1997); Douglas Lee 
Donoho, Autonomy, Self-Governance, and the Margin of Appreciation: Developing a 
Jurisprudence of Diversity within Universal Human Rights, 15 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 391 (2001). 
 207. See also Int’l Law Comm’n, 57th Session, Report of the Study Group on Fragmentation 
of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International 
Law, ¶¶ 19, 22, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.676 (July 29, 2005) [hereinafter ILC 57th Session Report] 
(deciding not to discuss cultural relativism and other divisions within human rights).  By 
avoiding the universality versus cultural relativism debate that seems to permeate international 
human rights law, it is hoped that there is less confusion between different sub-fields of 
international law over what is meant by the unity of international law.  See Andreas 
Zimmermann, Introductory Remarks, in UNITY AND DIVERSITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
supra note 12, at 25 (complaining that human rights specialists and non-specialists seemed to be 
speaking past each other at a recent conference on account of different terms of reference). 
 208. See W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary 
International Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866, 872-73 (1990); Consolidated Report, supra note 200, ¶ 
117 (“But most forms of international behaviour also have some bearing on ‘human 
rights’. . . .”); Consolidated Report, supra note 200, ¶ 133 n.164 (citing, inter alia, IAN 
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 529-30 (6th ed. 2006) (questioning 
the speciality of human rights law)). 
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based on a perceived difficulty that arises from fragmentation.  Since 
its establishment in 2002, the Study Group on the Fragmentation of 
International Law (Study Group) has been of the opinion that 
fragmentation is increasing due to various factors including the 
conflicts that arise from the increasing number of international 
tribunals, the lack of secondary rules in determining when to apply 
exceptions to the general rules, and the increasing collision of 
different specialized bodies of international law.209  In particular, the 
Study Group identified human rights law as one specialized body of 
international law that butts up against other bodies of international 
law.210 
Though, at times, the Study Group itself has alluded to the belief 
that international law is unified,211 it now seems to assume that 
international law is inherently fragmented.212  The study on 
fragmentation initially was subtitled “Risks of the Fragmentation of 
 
 209. See, e.g., Int’l Law Comm’n, 54th Session, Report of the Study Group on Fragmentation 
of International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.628 (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter ILC 54th Session 
Report]; Int’l Law Comm’n, 55th Session, Report of the Study Group on Fragmentation of 
International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International 
Law, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.644 (July 18, 2003) [hereinafter ILC 55th Session Report].  In 
later reports, these points are interspersed throughout the analysis, and are not summarized as 
neatly as in the preceding source.  See generally Int’l Law Comm’n, 56th Session, Report of the 
Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification 
and Expansion of International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.663/Rev.1 (July 28, 2004) [hereinafter 
ILC 56th Session Report]; ILC 57th Session Report, supra note 207; ILC 58th Session Report, 
supra note 200. 
 210. ILC 55th Session Report, supra note 209, ¶ 6; ILC 56th Session Report, supra note 209, 
¶¶ 21, 6.  For example, The Chairman of the Study Group, Koskenniemi sees this third source 
of fragmentation— conflicts between specialized bodies of law— as involving the pitting of 
certain rationalities against one another, with each rationality pointing to a separate authority to 
determine the outcome of conflicts.  Martti Koskenniemi, International Legislation Today: 
Limits and Possibilities, 23 WIS. INT’L L.J. 61, 8283 (2005) [hereinafter Koskenniemi, 
Legislation]. 
 211. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 
fifty-second session, Annex, at 144, U.N. Doc. A/55/10 (2000) [hereinafter ILC Report] (“Since 
the fragmentation of international law could endanger such stability as well as the consistency of 
international law and its comprehensive nature. . . .”). 
 212. It is interesting to note the negative approach of the ILC Study Group to this general 
debate.  This approach stands in stark contrast to the ILC’s earlier work, for as Crawford notes, 
“the Commission has characteristically dealt in ‘universals,’ in the sense of norms affecting all 
states, or at least all relevant states having regard to the terms and object of the norm in 
question (all coastal states, all host states, etc.).”  JAMES CRAWFORD, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS 
AN OPEN SYSTEM 583-84 (2002).  Indeed, ILC Statute Article 18(1) even talks of the 
Commission’s task to “survey the whole field of international law,” thus possibly indicating a 
presumption that the field of international law can be considered as somewhat unified.  See 
Statute of the International Law Commission, G.A. Res. 174(II), art. 18(1), U.N. GAOR, 2d 
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/519 (1947). 
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International Law,”213 though some ILC members did not like the 
reference to “risks” because of its negative connotation.  The name 
was, therefore, changed to “Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification of International Law.”  
Though its focus was on the negative and positive implications from 
fragmentation,214 the word “fragmentation” itself is still quite 
negative.215  Despite the name change, this Study Group has assumed, 
in a post modernist manner, that fragmentation is an inherent 
characteristic of the international legal system.216  Indeed, although 
the Study Group’s consolidated report implies that the “rapid 
expansion of international legal activity into various new fields and 
the diversification of its objects and techniques” are positive 
developments arising from international law’s fragmentation, in the 
very next paragraph the Study Group asserts that its rationale for 
studying fragmentation is to look at the problems that fragmentation 
causes with the coherence to international law.217  The Study Group 
thus emphasizes its negative approach to the topic.218 
The possibility that there are unifying forces within international 
law does not appear to feature in any portion of the study.  This could 
be explained in part by the scope of the study, as reflected in its 
subtitle “Difficulties Arising from the Diversification of International 
Law,” which essentially delimits the study to those areas where there 
are problems with fragmentation, and the unification of international 
law, wherever that might occur, would not be seen as a problem.  Still, 
some mention of the possibility of unification would have been 
expected, thus demonstrating their cup-half-empty mentality, so to 
speak.  Some positive results of fragmentation that the ILC Study 
Group could have mentioned were its promotion of the reliance on 
third-party dispute settlement and further development of 
 
 213. Gerhard Hafner, Risks Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law, in ILC 
Report, supra note 211, at 143, 143. 
 214. See, e.g., ILC 54th Session Report, supra note 209, ¶ 9; ILC 55th Session Report, supra 
note 209, ¶ 12; ILC 56th Session Report, supra note 209, ¶ 6; ILC 58th Session Report, supra 
note 200, ¶ 9. 
 215. See Bruno Simma, Fragmentation in a Positive Light, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 845, 846-47 
(2004) [hereinafter Simma, Positive]; Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 12, at 285. 
 216. See DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY: AN ENQUIRY INTO THE 
ORIGINS OF CULTURAL CHANGE 44, 49, 59 (1989) (talking about how fragmentation is a basic 
assumption of postmodernism). 
 217. Consolidated Report, supra note 200, at 14; ILC 58th Session Report, supra note 200, ¶ 
9. 
 218. But see ILC 54th Session Report, supra note 209, ¶ 7 (leaving out this latter paragraph 
on the rationale for its study). 
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international law from the increased diversity of opinions and 
specialization of decision-makers.219   
Moreover, there are several unifying factors that the ILC failed 
to mention.  There is a certain degree of cross-fertilization between 
different international tribunals and a sharing of ideas between their 
judges on many of the key doctrines of international law.220  One 
example from the arbitration world comes from the NAFTA Chapter 
11 framework, where there are numerous factors that lead to 
convergence of opinions, including cross-fertilization between 
NAFTA tribunals from the availability of past decisions by Chapter 
11 tribunals, even though the panels of arbitrators and the lawyers 
representing the parties come from different backgrounds.221  Burke-
White lists numerous other factors that act as unifying forces for 
international law, including the existence of general international law 
that virtually all international courts and tribunals take into 
consideration, an inter-judicial dialogue on multiple levels, quasi-
 
 219. See Gerhard Hafner, Pros and Cons Ensuing From Fragmentation of International Law, 
25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 849, 850-51, 859 (2004) (seeing fragmentation as a good development in 
that states could become more inclined to abide by international legal norms that are more of a 
regional nature, are perceived as being more in line with their interests, or are more tailored to 
a particular scenario); William W. Burke-White, International Legal Pluralism, 25 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 963, 970 (2004) (emphasizing how more courts are being faced with a greater number of 
cases that deal with international law, making the international legal system more active and 
important than ever); Donald L. Morgan, Implications of the Proliferation of International Legal 
Fora: The Example of the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 541, 541-42 (2002) 
(asserting that “the cohesion of international law is not yet generally regarded as significantly 
impaired by the proliferation of decisional bodies”); Jonathan I. Charney, The Impact on the 
International Legal System of the Growth of International Courts and Tribunals, 31 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 697, 704 (1999) [hereinafter Charney, Impact] (discussing how the greater the 
number of decisions based on international law, the stronger the international legal system 
becomes); Jonathan L. Charney, The Implications of Expanding International Dispute Settlement 
Systems: The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 69, 73-74 (1996) 
(discussing the impact from the establishment of the Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, but 
coming to more general conclusions as well); Tullio Treves, Conflicts Between the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the International Court of Justice, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL. 809, 809 (1999); Dietmar Prager, The Proliferation of International Judicial Organs, in 
PROLIFERATION OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 279 (Niels M. Blokker ed., 2001) 
(asserting and explaining that the proliferation of international tribunals has more benefits than 
disadvantages). 
 220. See Jonathan Charney, Is International Law Threatened by Multiple Tribunals?, 271 
RECUEIL DES COURS 101, 130 (1998); Charney, Impact, supra note 219, at 705. 
 221. Jack J. Coe, Jr., Taking Stock of NAFTA Chapter 11 in Its Tenth Year: An Interim 
Sketch of Selected Themes, Issues, and Methods, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1381, 1408-12 
(2003). 
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harmonization of procedures and traditions between international 
courts and tribunals, and the emergence of hybrid tribunals.222 
2. Self-Contained Regimes: Interrelated Wholes?  The ILC 
makes considerable reference to self-contained regimes, which along 
with lex specialis (or specialized law) also involves this debate 
between fragmentation and unification.223  The reader is reminded of 
the definition of fragmentation by Koskenniemi in the introduction to 
Part III above, which involved a discussion of self-contained 
regimes.224  Simma and Pulkowski walk the reader through the 
evolution of opinions on fragmentation of recent ILC Special 
Rapporteurs on State Responsibility.225  Riphagen advocates the idea 
that  self-contained regimes are distinct subsystems with primary and 
secondary rules being closely linked.  Arangio-Ruiz asserts that the 
concept was dubious and that specialized regimes could not be 
separated from general international law.  Crawford, then, essentially 
agrees with Arangio-Ruiz but avoids express use of the notion of self-
contained regimes in favor of the phrase “lex specialis” to conclude 
that there is a residual body of law that can be automatically applied 
if states have not contracted out of it. Such a long-standing dialogue 
over the concept suggests its complexity. 
The notion of a self-contained regime comes from the Permanent 
Court of International Justice’s S.S. Wimbledon case and was further 
developed by the International Court of Justice in its Tehran 
Hostages decision, though there in the context of secondary norms.226  
Interestingly, some commentators think that the doctrine of self-
contained regimes should not even exist.  Pierre-Marie Dupuy asserts 
that the doctrine of “self-contained regimes” is entirely misleading in 
that the ILC mistakenly introduced the notion based on a mistaken 
interpretation of the ICJ’s decision in the Tehran Hostage Case.227  
Others acknowledge the existence of the concept in international law, 
 
 222. See Burke-White, supra note 219, at 970-77. 
 223. Consolidated Report, supra note 200, ¶¶ 46-222. 
 224. See text accompanying supra note 203. 
 225. See Bruno Simma and Dirk Pulkowski, Of Planets and the Universe: Self-contained 
Regimes in International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 483, 493-94, 502 (2006). 
 226. See id. at 491 (quoting S.S. Wimbledon, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1, at 23-24; United 
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 38-40 (May 24)); 
Consolidated Report, supra note 200, ¶ 123. 
 227. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Danger of Fragmentation or Unification of the International 
Legal System and the International Court of Justice, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 791, 797 (1999) 
(citing, inter alia, various reports from special rapporteurs). 
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though they believe that there cannot be truly self-contained bodies 
of international law.228  This is because the existence of a legal order 
requires at least a tenuous relationship between subunits of that 
order, or else that subunit would become a separate order in its own 
right.229  ILC Special Rapporteurs on State Responsibility similarly 
have been careful to avoid saying that self-contained regimes are 
entirely autonomous.230  In fact, Arangio-Ruiz and Crawford seem to 
emphasize the openness of the international system.231  The Study 
Group insists that there are no fully autonomous regimes,232 though its 
broad definition of “self-contained regime” confuses the matter 
considerably: “interrelated wholes of primary and secondary rules, 
sometimes also referred to as ‘systems’ or ‘subsystems’ of rules that 
cover some particular problem differently from the way it would be 
covered under general law.”233  The phrase “interrelated wholes” 
contains a fundamental paradox at the heart of the debate here, 
because if wholes are interrelated, they can actually be seen as a 
single, larger whole.  Critics could try to argue over the definition of 
“whole” here to say that there is no actual paradox, but the plain 
meaning suffices to show the simplicity of this term: “Containing all 
components; complete; not divided or disjoined; in one unit.”234 
Despite this paradox, there are a smaller number of 
commentators who insist on the existence of autonomous, self-
contained regimes, and see this autonomy as inevitably leading to the 
 
 228. See James Crawford, The ILC’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts: A Retrospect, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 874, 880 (2002) (asserting that there are no truly 
self-contained bodies of law, which this Author agrees with); Bruno Simma, Self-contained 
Regimes, 16 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 111, 136 (1985) (admitting that “one has to recognize sooner or 
later that, beyond a certain point, insistence upon further ‘self-containment’ of specific legal 
consequences can only have a negative effect on the effectiveness of the primary rules 
concerned”); Marcelo Kohen, Comment, Treaty Law: There is No Need for Special Regimes, in 
UNITY AND DIVERSITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 12, at 241. 
 229. Georges Abi-Saab, Fragmentation or Unification: Some Concluding Remarks, 31 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 919, 926 (1999). 
 230. Consolidated Report, supra note 200, ¶¶ 138-52 (citing, inter alia, Willem Riphagen, 
Introduction, 1 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM. 202 (1982); Willem Riphagen, Third Report on State 
Responsibility, 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM. 30 (1982); Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, Third Report on State 
Responsibility, 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM. 25 (1991)). 
 231. See generally CRAWFORD, supra note 212, at 17-38; Consolidated Report, supra note 
200, ¶¶ 149-50. 
 232. See ILC 56th Session Report, supra note 209, ¶ 23; Consolidated Report, supra note 
200, ¶¶ 172, 492. 
 233. Consolidated Report, supra note 200, ¶ 128. 
 234. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2004). 
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fragmentation of international law.235  This Article dismisses this 
radical notion of self-contained regimes, since it is inconceivable for 
any social system to be made up of entirely autonomous subsystems  
All such systems are interlinked to some extent, even if only when it 
comes to interpretation.236  This Article also disagrees with calling 
these regimes “wholes” (whether qualified or unqualified) because 
this word is too often seen as  synonymous with “closed” or 
“complete,” as is indicated in the plain meaning of the word.237 
B. Fragmentation and Legal Pluralism 
At first glance, it would appear that the literature on legal 
pluralism would be applicable to the unification-versus-fragmentation 
debate.  Burke-White asserts that the unifying forces mentioned in 
Part III(A)(1) lead to a type of international legal pluralism, which he 
sees as falling short of a unified body of international law though it 
still goes against the notion of the inevitable fragmentation of 
international law.238  In particular, he posits that the current 
international legal system is “neither fully fragmented nor completely 
unitary” on account of these competing factors, but is more pluralist 
in nature in that it accepts “a range of different and equally legitimate 
normative choices by national governments and international 
institutions and tribunals, but it does so within the context of a 
universal system.”239  This is a somewhat unusual understanding of 
legal pluralism, since legal pluralism traditionally involves the 
presence of multiple legal orders operating at once without mention 
of an overarching, universal system that is operating in the 
background of these legal orders.  As explained in the following 
paragraphs, legal pluralism is not particularly helpful in resolving, or 
 
 235. Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for 
Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 999, 1013-17, 1045 (2004). 
 236. Simma & Pulkowski, supra note 225, at 492; Simma, Positive, supra note 215, at 847 
(acknowledging that “the various fragments will never be totally ‘self-contained’”); ILC 58th 
Session Report, supra note 2090, ¶ 14(1) (stating, inter alia, “There are meaningful relationships 
between [the different sets of norms within international law]”). 
 237. See text accompanying supra note 234.  After reading Part III(B) & (C) below, critics 
might allege that this Part sets up a straw man to knock it down, since it would appear that only 
Fischer-Lescano and Teubner expressly classify self-contained regimes as closed.  However, the 
more subtle classifications of many of the others contain an element of divided completeness 
(for lack of a better term) and that division destroys true completeness all the same. 
 238. See Burke-White, supra note 219, at 977-78. 
 239. Id. 
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even conceptualizing, the issues surrounding the unification-versus-
fragmentation debate. 
According to the body of literature on legal pluralism discussed 
below, it would seem somewhat easy to confuse legal pluralism with 
legal centralism, which Griffiths defines as the notion that “law is an 
exclusive, systematic and unified hierarchical ordering of normative 
propositions,” and which he places in a position opposite that of legal 
pluralism.240  Griffiths surprisingly goes so far as to say that “[t]he 
ideology of legal centralism has not only frustrated the development 
of general theory, it has also been the major hindrance to accurate 
observation” and that “[l]egal centralism is a myth, an ideal, a claim, 
an illusion,”241 thus showing the extent of his disdain for the ideology.  
Putting aside the question of whether Burke-White’s statements 
actually fit under legal centralism, his very acknowledgement of the 
context being “a universal system” implies that he accepts 
international law’s unity (the key word there being “universal,” not 
necessarily “system”), with the “recognition of a range of different 
normative choices” simply adding a wrinkle of nuance to that 
universality. 
With regard to defining legal pluralism, one must distinguish it 
from the plurality of law, which is the notion that different 
mechanisms apply to different situations all in one society.242  Hooker 
provides perhaps the simplest definition of legal pluralism: “The term 
‘legal pluralism’ refers to the situation in which two or more laws 
interact.”243  Vanderlinden’s definition—“the existence, within a given 
society, of different legal systems applicable to identical situations”—
would seem to add that legal pluralism is the applicability of different 
mechanisms to the same situation,244 which would seem to be more 
along the lines of the plurality of law.  Noticeably absent from both 
 
 240. See John Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL 
L. 1, 1-3 (1986); Gordon R. Woodman, Ideological Combat and Social Observation: Recent 
Debate About Legal Pluralism, 42 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 21, 23 (1998) 
(asserting that his “readings of these writers [on legal pluralism] coincide with those of 
Griffiths . . . “). 
 241. Griffiths, supra note 240, at 4. 
 242. Woodman, supra note 240, at 25. 
 243. M. BARRY HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO COLONIAL AND 
NEO-COLONIAL LAWS 6 (1975).  See also Woodman, supra note 240, at 26. 
 244. See Jacques Vanderlinden, Le Pluralisme Juridique: Essai de Synthèse, in LE 
PLURALISME JURIDIQUE 19, 19 (John Gilissen ed., 1971) (“L’existence, au sein d’une société 
déterminée, de méchanismes juridiques différents s’appliquant à situations identiques.”).  See 
also Woodman, supra note 240, at 24. 
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definitions is any allusion to there being a unified or fragmented 
system at play.  In his seminal article What is Legal Pluralism?, 
Griffiths defines legal pluralism as follows: 
Legal pluralism is a concomitant of social pluralism: the legal 
organization of society is congruent with its social organization.  
“Legal pluralism” refers to the normative heterogeneity attendant 
upon the fact that social action always takes place in a context of 
multiple, overlapping “semi-autonomous social fields,” which it 
may be added, is in practice a dynamic condition.245 
In short, although the concept of legal pluralism is a stimulating, and 
perhaps even fashionable, topic in exploring the nature of law,246 it 
does not seem to fit directly into the unification-versus-fragmentation 
debate on the international level where there is no institutional 
hierarchy or global government that imposes its decisions on the 
competing bodies of law as the state has the power to do within the 
domestic context.247  Although not the most powerful arguments on 
their own, the Study Group’s cursory dismissal in a footnote of legal 
pluralism’s relevance to its analysis of fragmentation on account of 
legal pluralism’s focus on the “coexistence of indigenous and Western 
law in old colonial territories as well as the emergence of types of 
private law in domestic societies,”248 as well as the scant reference to 
legal pluralism in the literature on fragmentation, support this 
conclusion. 
Assuming, arguendo, that legal pluralism is applicable to this 
debate, it would seem to support the unity of international law and 
not its fragmentation.  As Franz von Benda-Beckmann asserts, it 
would be incorrect to conclude, though such a conclusion often is 
made, that “legal pluralism would imply the existence of distinct 
 
 245. See, e.g., Griffiths, supra note 240, at 38.  Please note that Griffiths’ reference to “semi-
autonomous” was to social fields, not to bodies of law, and the reference to “normative 
heterogeneity” does not mean that he sees specialized regimes as entirely independent.  
Moreover, Griffiths makes the point about the irrelevance of legal pluralism to the debate at 
hand when he states in his conclusion, “Legal pluralism is an attribute of a social field and not of 
‘law’ or of a ‘legal system,’” thus rendering irrelevant any of his comments that might seem to 
support fragmentation.  Id.; see also Sally F. Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-
Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 719 (1973).  
Interestingly, Roberts praises Griffiths for moving the literature away from legal centralism.  
See Simon Roberts, Against Legal Pluralism: Some Reflections on the Contemporary 
Enlargement of the Legal Domain, 42 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 95, 96 (1998). 
 246. Roberts, supra note 245, at 96, 101. 
 247. This is the case even though some scholars seem to base their definition of legal 
pluralism on presuppositions of legal centralism, though Griffiths persuasively shows why this is 
inappropriate.  See Griffiths, supra note 240, at 9-14. 
 248. Consolidated Report, supra note 200, ¶ 8 n.13. 
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unconnected legal systems and/or neglect power differences between 
them.”249  The concurrent operation of different bodies of law within 
one domestic legal order—for example, the distinct bodies of law 
relating to common law marriage and legal marriage—do not make 
the one, overarching legal system any less unified.250  On the contrary, 
as Roberts explains when discussing the conceptualization of the 
plural scene, “Normative orders, including that presented by the 
national legal system, are best seen as partially discrete, but 
nevertheless overlapping and interpenetrating social fields, within 
which meaning is communicated on a two-way, interactive basis.”251  
Thus, although the specialized bodies of law have their own 
identifying characteristics, it would be inappropriate to characterize 
them as autonomous or the system in which they exist as 
fragmented—fragmentation again being defined as the breaking 
down of general international law into autonomous self-contained 
regimes, with the autopoietic nature self-contained regimes causing 
the most problems.  Related words such as “semi-autonomous”, 
however, lack this idea of autopoiesis, and imply residual unity.  
Moore writes about the semi-autonomous nature of such social fields 
as being able to “generate rules and customs and symbols internally, 
but . . . is also vulnerable to rules and decisions and other forces 
emanating from the larger world by which it is surrounded.”252  This 
would seem to be the most fitting description for the relationship 
between human rights jurisprudence and international investment 
arbitration, though theorists such as Teubner who see specialized 
bodies of law as fully autonomous will disagree with this description, 
instead asserting that these closed systems merely are responding to 
their environment.  However, the arbitration cases that expressly rely 
on human rights jurisprudence, as discussed in Part I above, show that 
the norms of one specialized body of law have crossed over the 
border into another, demonstrating a level of interchange that 
supports the notion of unity. 
 
 249. Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Who’s Afraid of Legal Pluralism?, 47 J. LEGAL 
PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 37, 46 (2002). 
 250. See id. at 63 (distinguishing between system-internal pluralism and pluralism of 
systems). 
 251. Roberts, supra note 245, at 101. 
 252. SALLY F. MOORE, LAW AS PROCESS 55 (1978); see also Roberts, supra note 245, at 101. 
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C. The Two Competing Camps 
Many scholars have weighed in on whether they see the 
international legal system as more unified or fragmented.  Without 
going into the idiosyncrasies of each scholar’s views, the mainstream 
view would appear to be that international law is unified and that that 
unification is worth preserving.253  Moreover, some ILC statements 
and several speeches of ICJ Presidents to the General Assembly 
reflect this view,254 as well as Crawford’s version of the Draft Articles 
on State Responsibility,255 which came out two years before the Study 
 
 253. See, e.g., Simma, Positive, supra note 215, at 845-46; Charney, Impact, supra note 219, at 
707-08; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Justice as Conflict Resolution: Proliferation, Fragmentation, 
and Decentralization of Dispute Settlement in International Trade, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 
273, 280 (2006) (asserting that international tribunals need to act as the “guardians of unity in 
international law” in the face of increasing fragmentation); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, L’Unité de 
l’Ordre Juridique International: Cours Général de Droit International Public, 297 RECUEIL DES 
COURS 9 (2002); Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao, Multiple International Judicial Forums: A 
Reflection of the Growing Strength of International Law or its Fragmentation?, 25 MICH. J. INT’L 
L. 929 (2004); Dupuy, supra note 227, at 792; Rainer Hofmann, Introductory Remarks, in UNITY 
AND DIVERSITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 12, at 21-22 (“Among these challenges 
[to international law in maintaining international peace], I should like to mention one of the 
risks resulting from the very fast development of international law, namely the risk of becoming 
too diverse, of losing its unity and, thereby, its quality as truly international law.”); Karel 
Wellens, Diversity in Secondary Rules and the Unity of International Law: Some Reflections on 
Current Trends, in DIVERSITY IN SECONDARY RULES AND THE UNITY OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 3, 4, 26 (L.A.N.M. Barnhoorn & K.C. Wellens eds., 1995). 
 254. See Koskenniemi & Leino, supra note 202, at 553-55 (quoting, inter alia, Stephem M. 
Schwebel, Address to the Plenary Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Oct. 
26, 1999 (“[I]n order to minimize such possibility as may occur of significant conflicting 
interpretations of international law, there might be virtue in enabling other international 
tribunals to request advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice on issues of 
international law that arise in cases before those tribunals that are of importance to the unity of 
international law.”) and Gilbert Guillaume, Address to the Plenary Session of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations, Oct. 30, 2001 (“The proliferation of international courts may 
jeopardize the unity of international law and, as a consequence, its role in inter-State 
relations.”)); Rao, supra note 253, at 938-39. 
 255. Daniel Bodansky & John R. Crook, The ILC’s State Responsibility Articles: 
Introduction and Overview, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 773, 781 (2002); James Crawford, Revising the 
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 435, 436-37 (1999) (commenting that 
the revision of the Draft Articles after their First Reading would involve “bringing into account 
the more recent case law of the International Court . . . relevant cases of the various tribunals 
(especially the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and ICSID tribunals; more recently, WTO 
panels and the Appellate Body) together with the jurisprudence of the human rights courts and 
committees, and integrating them within the classical structure of the Draft Articles”).  In fact, 
Crawford asserts that “the Commission has characteristically dealt in ‘universals,’ in the sense of 
norms affecting all states, or at least all relevant states having regard to the terms and object of 
the norm in question (all coastal states, all host states, etc.).”  CRAWFORD, supra note 212, at 
583-84. However, this statement was made well before the work of the ILC’s Study Group on 
Fragmentation began. 
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Group became active.  As Birnie and Boyle point out in the 
international environmental law context, the ICJ seems to prefer an 
integrated approach to international law over a fragmented approach, 
where multiple bodies of international law are taken into 
consideration in resolving the case before it.256  Indeed, this can be 
seen in the Gabcikovo-Nagmaros Project case where environmental 
law was taken into account in deciding an essentially investment 
dispute,257 in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion where the ICJ 
combined environmental law issues with use-of-force issues,258 and in 
the Wall advisory opinion where the ICJ said that human rights law 
applied at the same time as international humanitarian law in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory.259  Although these are clear examples 
of international law’s developing unity in the past decade, it is 
possible to see the ICJ was responding to the arguments placed 
before it.  Thus, though the fact that it deals with multiple bodies of 
law within the same section of a decision does not necessarily mean 
that it is inclined towards an integrated approach to international law, 
it still might very well have such an inclination.  Further, given the 
cases mentioned in Part I, the same inclination towards an integrated 
approach to international law might also be a characteristic of 
international investment arbitral tribunals, despite lawyers’ 
arguments in an arbitral proceeding focusing  the tribunal’s 
decision.260  Some critics might argue that such assertions in favor of 
international law’s unity are merely a reaction to postmodernism, 
 
 256. See P.W. BERNIE & A.E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 80 
(2d ed. 2002). 
 257. Gabcikovo-Nagymoros (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 67-68, 77-78 (Sept. 25); BERNIE 
& BOYLE, supra note 256, at 80 n.13. 
 258. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 
241-44 (July 8); BERNIE & BOYLE, supra note 256, at 80 n.13. 
 259. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131, 171-81 (July 9).  Moreover, the U.N. Human 
Rights Council recently determined that the Universal Periodic Review of states is to be done 
with the both human rights and international humanitarian law acting as the standards.  U.N. 
Human Rts. Council, Intersessional open-ended intergovernmental Working Group to develop 
the modalities of the universal periodic review mechanism established pursuant to Human 
Rights Council decision 1/103, Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15 
March 2006 Entitled “Human Rights Council”, at 2, UN Doc. A/HRC/5/14 (June 6, 2007).  
Please note that the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion made clear that the lex 
specialis (or international humanitarian law) would be used to determine what “arbitrary 
deprivation of life” means, and not human rights law.  See Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 240 (July 8); Consolidated Report, supra 
note 200, at ¶¶ 96, 103-04. 
 260. Coe, supra note 221, at 1407. 
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with its assumption of fragmentation of the international legal 
order.261  However, one must not forget that the very study of the 
process of fragmentation presupposes that the original was a whole or 
was at least more unified than it is now.262 
Still, there are a considerable number of commentators who 
think fragmentation is inevitable.  In one of the first publications to 
discuss the fragmentation of international law, though without using 
the word “fragmentation” more than once, Weil seems to be of the 
opinion that fragmentation is inevitable.263  The Study Group itself 
concludes that “normative conflict[s] [are] endemic to international 
law” on account of the lack of hierarchy within the international law-
making process,264 but this ignores the spontaneous reconciling, and 
even borrowing, of norms between specialized regimes, which the 
reference to autonomous self-contained regimes within the definition 
of fragmentation would seem to not allow.  Koskenniemi and Leino 
describe the conflicts between the normative systems of international 
law as “pathological,” thus seeming to assume that international law 
is bound to a fragmented existence.265  More recently, Koskenniemi 
asserted that “[t]he international context, perhaps like ‘modernity’ 
tout court, was always ‘fragmented.’”266  This was the same point that 
the Study Group asserted at the beginning and at the end of its 
work,267 which is not surprising given that Koskenniemi was the Study 
Group’s Chairman.  Yet again, Koskenniemi’s view of the 
international system seems inherently pessimistic when he asserts, 
“Alongside general law, today we have human rights law, 
international trade law, international criminal law, international 
environmental law and so on, with the general law breaking into 
particular principles and institutions with conflicting procedures and 
preferences[; t]here is no end to the fragmentation of the 
international world into such instrumental rationalities.”268  Quite a 
 
 261. See Koskenniemi & Leino, supra note 202, at 553. 
 262. Simma, Positive, supra note 215, at 847; Rao, supra note 253, at 930. 
 263. Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 
413 (1983). 
 264. See Consolidated Report, supra note 200, ¶ 486. 
 265. Koskenniemi & Leino, supra note 202, at 560, 576.  “Pathological” is seen as meaning 
habitual, compulsive or inevitable in this context.  See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF 
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2004). 
 266. Koskenniemi, Mindset, supra note 202, at 22. 
 267. Consolidated Report, supra note 200, ¶ 16; ILC 54th Session Report, supra note 209, ¶ 
6. 
 268. Koskenniemi, Legislation, supra note 210, at 81. 
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few other commentators are fatalistic over international law’s 
fragmentation,269 while others implicitly assume international law’s 
fragmentation.270  Burca and Gerstenberg assert that the international 
law discourse sees the “sharp ethnic, cultural, ideological, 
constitutional, and economic diversity” as leading to “an irreversible 
loss of law’s unity” by its fragmentation into “parallel ‘regimes.’”271  
Hafner might be interpreted as saying that fragmentation is 
unavoidable,272 in part because he says that the “international legal 
system cannot avoid normative conflicts . . . because it lacks clear 
legal guidance for the resolution of conflicts of norms.”273  However, 
in the very next sentence Hafner asserts, “This situation threatens the 
unity of the international legal system,” which implies a belief that 
unity will continue if these conflicts do not break it apart.274  Fischer-
Lescano and Teubner are fatalistic in their analysis of fragmentation, 
claiming that international law is doomed to a fragmented existence 
because it is made of autonomous, self-contained regimes275 and 
because global society itself is unavoidably fragmented,276 though they 
fall short of adequately explaining why it is so unavoidable.  Indeed, 
Fischer-Lescano and Teubner seem to prematurely foreclose the very 
possibility that investment arbitral tribunals will rely on other bodies 
of law when they assert the following: 
In contrast to the courts of developed Nation-States that guarantee 
legal unity, globally dispersed courts, tribunals, arbitration panels 
and alternative dispute resolution bodies are so closely coupled, 
both in terms of organization and self-perception, with their own 
specialized regimes in the legal periphery that they necessarily 
contribute to a global legal fragmentation.277 
 
 269. Kalypso Nicolaidis & Joyce L. Tong, Conclusion: Diversity or Cacophony? The 
Continuing Debate Over New Sources of International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1349, 1372 
(2004). 
 270. Monica Pinto, Fragmentation or Unification Among International Institutions: Human 
Rights Tribunals, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 833, 841 (1999) (“The reasonable goal of 
unification of the international legal system necessarily involves the international protection of 
human rights.”). 
 271. Grainne de Burca & Oliver Gerstenberg, The Denationalization of Constitutional Law, 
47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 243, 245-46 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 272. Annika Tahvanainen, Commentary, Comment to Professor Hafner, 25 MICH. J. INT’L 
L. 865, 865 (2004). 
 273. Hafner, supra note 219, at 854. 
 274. Id. 
 275. See Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 235, at 1013-17, 1045. 
 276. See id. at 1004, 1017. 
 277. Id. at 1014 (emphasis added). 
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That said, they make the normative argument that “arbitration 
instances must move beyond concrete contractual terms in order to 
take environmental consequences and human rights complications 
into account as part of a specific ius non dispositivum . . .”278 which, as 
this Article demonstrates, already is taking place to some extent.  
Instead of unity of international law, they assert that the best that can 
be hoped for is a “weak compatibility between the fragments” if 
conflicts law can create a network logic.279  However, it is again not 
exactly clear why they think that this compatibility cannot constitute a 
degree of unification of international law.  On the contrary, they seem 
to assume that these bodies of law are absolutely self-contained, thus 
making it impossible for them to be unified and reconciled to any 
degree on certain instances.  However, the whole point of the 
conflict-of-laws rules comprising private international law (at least 
within the common law system) is to make compatible otherwise 
incompatible bodies of law.  Regardless, one must not forget that 
Fischer-Lescano and Teubner’s views on fragmentation are not in the 
mainstream.280 
In sum, the opinions contained in the preceding paragraph ignore 
the instances where particular bodies of law overlap without 
conflicting, as with the cases mentioned in Part I above.  These cases 
suggest that there ultimately might be an end to the fragmentation of 
the international legal order after all, assuming there was a beginning. 
Ultimately, both sides of this debate have strong arguments for 
seeing international law either as unified or fragmented.  This 
remainder of this Section critically reviews some of those 
arguments.281 
The arguments from the unification (or ‘universalists’) camp 
range from the simple to the complex.  On the former end of the 
spectrum, Abi-Saab blames critical legal scholars such as Kennedy for 
 
 278. Id. at 1038. 
 279. Id. at 1045. 
 280. See Simma, Positive, supra note 215, at 847. 
 281. One cross-cutting issue to keep in mind is the pivotal role of the end of the Cold War in 
this debate.  This focus on the Cold War having transformed the system might reflect liberal 
democratic thinking on the fragmentation problem where democratization of states can be seen 
as naturally leading to a greater desire to settle disputes peacefully, though an entirely different 
theory that emphasizes the gradual evolution of the international system outside of the events 
surrounding the end of the Cold War is equally as plausible an explanation for the 
fragmentation phenomenon.  See, e.g., Rao, supra note 253, at 930, 958-60 (asserting that the 
purpose of this article is to show that the fragmentation of international law is “a sign of the 
growing maturity of international law”). 
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creating somewhat artificial divisions in an otherwise unified body of 
law.282  On the other end is Pauwelyn, who argues that the 
fragmentation of international law, which results from the system’s 
roots in state consent, made it possible for the international 
community (or parts thereof) to cooperate during the Cold War on 
trade- and economic-related issues through such institutions as the 
World Bank and IMF for the specific reason that they were able to 
avoid much of the political struggle that was characteristic of this 
period.283  However, once the Cold War ended, the former communist 
states joined those economic-oriented organizations and broke down 
the neat divide that had developed between both spheres, with 
political- and economic-related issues quickly coming linked.284  Such 
linkage, which also has been helped along by zealous NGOs, has 
removed much of the meaning of the distinction between public 
international law and international economic law at the global level.285 
The commentators within the fragmentation (or particularists’) 
camp can be loosely categorized into four groups.286  The first group 
sees the increasing specialization of society and law as a fundamental 
cause of fragmentation, arguing that specialization since the end of 
the Cold War has so entrenched the idea of the fragmentation of 
international law into the collective psyche that fragmentation is 
assumed to be inherent in the contemporary system.287  The ILC 
Study Group would fall into this category, as it sees technically 
specialized cooperation networks creating their own rules because 
general international law does not adequately take into account the 
 
 282. See Abi-Saab, supra note 229, at 919-20. 
 283. See Joost Pauwelyn, Bridging Fragmentation and Unity: International Law as a Universe 
of Inter-Connected Islands, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 903, 903 (2004).  Interestingly, such institutions 
were even required to avoid political issues in their operations, according to their articles of 
agreement.  See id. 
 284. See id. 
 285. See id.  When speaking of this divide on the international level, it is somewhat 
irrelevant that individual states may have broken down this divide within their domestic 
jurisdictions much earlier than the end of the Cold War.  See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. 
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628-40 (1985) (determining that an antitrust 
dispute, which fell within the realm of public interest, was nonetheless subject to arbitration 
under the Federal Arbitration Act). 
 286. The terms “particularism” and “fragmentation” are used interchangeably.  Please note 
that the use of the term “particularism” is not meant to be derogatory in any way. 
 287. See Charlotte Ku, The ASIL and the International Law Network, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 
NEWSL. (ASIL, Washington, D.C.), June 1995 (noting the link between specialization and 
fragmentation). 
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needs of that specialized community.288  According to the Study 
Group, this is the essence of the problems surrounding fragmentation, 
along with their conclusion that these special regimes “have no clear 
relationship to each other.”289  It is this type of assertion that Part II of 
the Article refutes.  The Study Group concludes that what is needed 
is state legislation to fix this problem and not a technical answer from 
the legal community.290  However, as this Article suggests, arbitral 
tribunals are able to incorporate to a certain degree different 
specialized regimes in an ad hoc fashion without such legislation or 
institutional hierarchies. 
The second group sees the increasing number of actors within the 
international realm as a fundamental cause of fragmentation.  
Petersmann would fall into this group, since he sees the “ever-
expanding scope of international economic law” after the end of the 
Cold War as a major cause of conflict within international law.291  
Stark seems to think that because there are different actors operating 
within the realm of international law all with a different view of what 
the law should be that the law is inherently fragmented.292  
Kosekenniemi and Leino see the end of the Cold War as a key point 
in time in that talk of making international law a complete system 
became possible again after the Cold War, though they assert that it 
was liberalism and globalization that frustrated all moves to making it 
such a system in that, after the Cold War, there was “a kaleidoscopic 
reality in which competing actors struggled to create competing 
normative systems often expressly to escape from the strictures of 
diplomatic law— though perhaps more often in blissful ignorance 
about it.”293 
The third group includes commentators, such as Hafner, who see 
the international legal system as being more fragmented since the end 
of the Cold War due to a variety of different factors, including the 
proliferation of international regulations, greater political 
fragmentation, regionalization of international law, individuals 
becoming subjects of international law separate from that of states, 
 
 288. See Consolidated Report, supra note 200, ¶ 482. 
 289. Id. ¶ 483. 
 290. See id. ¶ 484. 
 291. Petersmann, supra note 253, at 280. 
 292. See Barbara Stark, Afterword, “Violations of Human Dignity” and Postmodern 
International Law, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 315, 345 (2002). 
 293. Koskenniemi & Leino, supra note 202, at 559. 
02__FRY.DOC 5/27/2008  1:27:26 PM 
140 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 18:77 
and the specialization of international regulations.294  The fourth 
group sees globalization and the loss of some local control as a 
fundamental cause of fragmentation.  Schachter seems to view a form 
of fragmentation as a response to globalization as people try to 
preserve their identity from the “remote anonymous forces [that seem 
to] control their lives.”295  It is interesting to note how scholars can 
take these same observations about the international system and 
come to the opposite conclusion.  For example, Jackson claims that 
globalization raises the strong need for uniformity of rules that will 
govern all of the players in the market.296  Crawford adopts this same 
thinking, but goes a step further, saying that globalization has 
“accentuated the trend towards relative uniformity in recent years,”297 
not merely that globalization calls for greater uniformity.298  Likewise, 
Leubuscher sees globalization as leading to the “conflation of public 
and private needs” and the interconnection between individuals, 
corporations and the state.299  This contradiction raises the question of 
whether it is possible that two opposing interpretations of key facts 
surrounding globalization and the end of the Cold War can be right. 
This question can be rephrased as whether international law 
accurately can be characterized as both united and fragmented at the 
same time.  The legal theorist Vanderlinden seems tormented by his 
struggles over defining the nature of the international legal system, 
claiming that the idea of a pluralistic legal system is impossible 
 
 294. See Hafner, supra note 219, at 849-50. 
 295. Oscar Schachter, The Decline of the Nation-State and Its Implications for International 
Law, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 7, 17 (1997). 
 296. See John H. Jackson, Fragmentation or Unification Among International Institutions: 
The World Trade Organization, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 823, 824 (1999). 
 297. CRAWFORD, supra note 212, at 576 (Crawford nonetheless recognizes the “significant 
divergences of policy, interest and approach amongst states and groups of states”). 
 298. Unlike some commentators, this Article uses unity and uniformity synonymously, even 
though it might be possible to distinguish the two.  See Anja Seibert-Fohr, Unity and Diversity in 
the Formation and Relevance of Customary International Law, in UNITY AND DIVERSITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 12, at 278. 
 299. See Susan Leubuscher, The Privatisation of Law: International Investment Agreements 
as Acts of Pretended Legislation, 3 TRANSNAT’L DISPUTES MGMT. No. 2, at 1-2 (2006).  See also 
The Secretary-General, Preliminary Report of the Secretary-General, Globalization and its 
Impact on the Full Enjoyment of All Human Rights, at 2, 9, U.N. Doc. A/55/342 (Aug. 31, 2000) 
(seeing globalization as linking peoples lives and different aspects of society together, though 
identifying that some parts of society do not benefit from these changes).  Christian Tomuschat, 
International Law as the Constitution of Mankind, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE EVE OF 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: VIEWS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 37 
(United Nations ed., 1997) (asserting that the international community increasingly adopts the 
notion of shared fundamental values). 
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because such is “either self-contradictory or redundant,”300 
presumably on account of the competing factors of unity and 
fragmentation.301  Other commentators appear somewhat less genuine 
as they grapple with this issue, instead seeming to hedge their bets.  
As Hersch Lauterpacht asserted, “The disunity of the modern world 
is a fact; but so, in a truer sense, is its unity.”302  Schermers and 
Blokker conclude in their book International Institutional Law: Unity 
within Diversity that “international organizations vary greatly” 
though they have “much in common.”303  With regard to reservations, 
Bröhmer talks paradoxically of how “reservations are an instrument 
to gain more unity by accepting some degree of diversity.”304  More 
generally, Gowlland-Debbas labels as “paradoxical[l]” her point that 
“the greater the degree of specialization, the more self-contained the 
regimes, the greater is the trend towards permeability between 
different fields of law . . . .”305  Crawford talks of “the ideal of 
universality” in international law “only be[ing] achieved on the basis 
of some allowance for disagreement on particulars,” which he himself 
sees as “paradoxical, a spurious sort of ‘unity in diversity.’”306  
Nonetheless, Crawford concludes that such paradoxical “unity in 
diversity” is “the necessary product of an attempt to conceive of and 
to organise a global society of states in the persistent absence of any 
central authority.”307  One cannot help but wonder if the use of such 
paradoxes is a way for commentators to avoid the difficult question of 
whether the international legal system is better characterized as 
unified than fragmented, or vice versa. 
Still other commentators see the debate as somewhat of a social 
construct.  Oeter talks of the unity of international law as being a 
social construct that the international community “will try to achieve 
 
 300. Jacques Vanderlinden, Return to Legal Pluralism: Twenty Years Later, 28 J. LEGAL 
PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 149, 152-54 (1989). 
 301. Id. 
 302. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW 26 (1975). 
 303. HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NIELS M. BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
UNITY WITHIN DIVERSITY 15 (4th rev. ed. 2003); see also id., at 1205-09; CRAWFORD, supra 
note 212, at 576. 
 304. Jürgen Bröhmer, Comment, in UNITY AND DIVERSITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra 
note 12, at 253. 
 305. Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 12, at 285.  Interestingly, Gowlland-Debbas switches the 
order “diversity within unity,” apparently to emphasize the unity of the system.  Id. 
 306. CRAWFORD, supra note 212, at 594. 
 307. Id. 
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while never putting it into reality completely.”308  The ILC Study 
Group has asserted that “‘fragmentation’ and ‘coherence’” of the 
international legal system is all “in the eye of the beholder,”309 thus 
implying that the international legal system is neither objectively 
fragmented nor unified.  Regardless of whether it is a social construct, 
the important question is whether it has any value in explaining the 
dynamics of the international legal order. 
This Article does not dismiss the possibility that the ultimate 
conclusion in the unity-versus-fragmentation debate will be that both 
unity and disunity can coexist.  Yet, it would be unwise to dismiss the 
possibility that either unity or disunity better characterizes the 
international system, just as one ought not to have dismissed in 
ancient times the theory that the world was round merely because 
there were many competing theories at that time.  From a practical 
perspective, there is no way to definitively determine in such a limited 
study whether the international legal system is unified, fragmented or 
both.  From a theoretical perspective, however, it is difficult to see 
international law as anything other than a complete system at this 
point in time.  International legal norms must be thought of in 
relation to other norms—such as domestic legal norms and cultural 
norms—thus connecting norms together in one large network.310  
Moreover, it is difficult to see the debate in anything but a binary 
fashion—either the universal system is unified or it is not.  Indeed, 
“unity” and “diversity” are opposites.311  While opposites do not 
necessarily imply tertium non datur (or that there is no third 
possibility), in this case there is no third possibility because the very 
definition of “unity” involves the absence of diversity, which would 
constitute a truly mutually exclusive arrangement.312  In other words, 
once a part becomes separated from the system, then it becomes a 
system unto itself.  When the issue becomes one of degree of 
connection, as is the case here despite the extreme opinions of 
 
 308. Stefan Oeter, Comment, Unity and Diversity of International Law in the Settlement of 
International Disputes, in UNITY AND DIVERSITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 12, at 
419. 
 309. Consolidated Report, supra note 200, ¶ 20. 
 310. François Ewald, The Law of Law, in AUTOPOIETIC LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO LAW 
AND SOCIETY 36, 36 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1988).  See also Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 12, at 
286. 
 311. Rudolf, supra note 204, at 390-91. 
 312. See Dictionary.com Unabridged (v. 1.1), http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/unity 
(last visited Aug. 2, 2007). 
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Fischer-Lescano and Teubner,313 then the existence of a connection 
would appear to be taken as a given.314  This would be so regardless of 
whether the whole could be better organized or more of a coherent 
system, since even a loosely connected system of parts is still a 
systemic whole.315  A dog has four legs, all of which have a similar but 
somewhat different structure, though they all make up part of one 
dog.  Surely “fragmented” does not seem like a fitting description for 
a typical dog.  The same is true with the various bodies of law that 
make up international law, with there being sufficient unity 
throughout the parts for it to be a workable system.  With this in 
mind, the following Section explains why the universalists’ views on 
international law are more persuasive than those of the particularists. 
D. International Law’s Unity 
Despite the best efforts of particularists in arguing in favor of 
international law’s fragmentation, this Article agrees more with the 
universalists for three reasons.  The first reason deals with the general 
flexibility that decision-makers have in reaching their decisions.  As 
Stark points out, international law tends to be fragmented on account 
of its lack of a centralized law-giver or decision-making.316  However, 
this lack of centralization does not necessarily mean that different 
subject-matter areas have to conflict one with another or that 
decision-makers within each specialized body of law cannot sua 
sponte deal with conflicts as they arise.  Just as the ICJ is not bound 
by precedent under ICJ Statute Article 59, it can, indeed, consider all 
judicial decisions, among other sources provided under ICJ Statute 
Article 38.317  Likewise, there is nothing stopping any international 
court or tribunal from borrowing from the decisions of other fora in 
reaching their own decisions, though there is the likely caveat that 
such external decisions cannot be incompatible with the most relevant 
law for that court or tribunal.  Indeed, tribunals of limited jurisdiction 
 
 313. See supra text accompanying notes 275-79. 
 314. Similarly, an assertion that “there are few true universals in international law” implies 
that there are at least some universals.  CRAWFORD, supra note 212, at 588. 
 315. Please note that this likely is a controversial point.  As Woodman has asserted, legal 
pluralism is a “non-taxonomic conception, a continuous variable,” so it is impossible to 
distinguish between unitary and plural legal situations.  Woodman, supra note 240, at 54.  That 
said, Woodman is not saying that systems of law do not exist, as von Benda-Beckmann 
characterizes him as saying.  See von Benda-Beckmann, supra note 249, at 63. 
 316. See Stark, supra note 292, at 337-38. 
 317. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(d), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1055, 1060 [hereinafter ICJ Statute] (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945). 
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(which includes most international tribunals) are not limited in the 
scope of the applicable law that they can use in interpreting and 
applying the relevant treaties they are limited to interpreting and 
applying.318  As Crawford has noted in the human rights context, 
“international human rights courts and tribunals have to apply 
international human rights standards to situations in which national 
law is intimately engaged,” and in the investment arbitration context, 
“the applicable law [in a BIT arbitration] is some combination of 
international and applicable national law.”319  As Heck asserts, “while 
[the judge] must decide the individual case before him, he does so by 
applying the entire legal order.”320  Within the context of the self-
contained-regimes debate, Koskenniemi has concluded that 
“international practice has never treated specialized rule-systems as 
independent from the rest of the law[; y]ou could not just take one bit 
and leave the rest aside: il n’y pas de hors-droit.”321  The same 
arguably can be said for arbitrators and the rules that they apply.  
Indeed, as Bucher and Tschanz point out, arbitrators do not operate 
simply under the agreement before them or in a legal vacuum.322  How 
can anyone say that such a porous system as international law is truly 
fragmented?  Such flexibility means that there are no formalized 
barriers between specialized bodies of law. 
The second reason for why the universalists’ view is more 
persuasive deals with the inherent unity of the international legal 
system despite the trend towards specialization.  Society in the past 
few decades has become so sophisticated that “specialization” seems 
to be the motto.  20th century international law largely has given up 
the theoretical emphasis that existed prior to the First World War in 
favor of a more pragmatic approach to international law and on what 
functions for practitioners in real situations.323  The pragmatic 
approach to international law seems to rely on the fragmentation of 
 
 318. See Consolidated Report, supra note 200, ¶¶ 44-45; Antonio R. Parra, Applicable 
Substantive Law in ICSID Arbitrations Initiated Under Investment Treaties, 16 ICSID REV.—
FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 20, 21 (2001). 
 319. CRAWFORD, supra note 212, at 23-24. 
 320. Simma & Pulkowski, supra note 225, at 498 (quoting P. HECK, BEGRIFFSBILDUNG UND 
INTERESSENJURISPRUDENZ 107 (1932)). 
 321. Koskenniemi, Mindset, supra note 202, at 19 (the English translation being “there is 
nothing that is outside of law”). 
 322. See ANDREAS BUCHER & PIERRE-YVES TSCHANZ, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN 
SWITZERLAND 102-03 (1988). 
 323. See David Kennedy, International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an 
Illusion, 17 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 99, 100-02, 112-13, 116, 120-21 (1997). 
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state sovereignty and the rejection of formalism.324  As law (and even 
international law) becomes more of a trade and as these practitioners 
become more specialized, international law becomes more 
compartmentalized and the bodies of rules and paradigms that each 
type of practitioner uses evolves along its distinct path.  Still, despite 
this relative compartmentalization of practice, the semblance of the 
largely forgotten parent—a unified system of international law in the 
19th century—can be seen in virtually all areas.  As Kennedy posits, 
international lawyers at the end of the 19th century “would sharpen 
the analogy between international public law and the private law of 
contract and property, and would increasingly think of a single, 
universal, international legal fabric ordering relations among civilized 
and uncivilized states.”325  More emphasis on the theory of 
international law might help resuscitate these entirely relevant and 
valid notions of unity that underlie the current legal system.  
Nonetheless, one must not forget that even contemporary sources 
acknowledge that all legal systems have common elements, such as 
pacta sunt servanda, good faith, fair hearings, and nemo judex in re 
sua, which is reflected in the basic idea that general principles of law 
are a source of international law under ICJ Statute Article 38.326  This 
is so despite the countless differences between such systems, thus 
underlining the fundamental unity of international law.327  On a 
related point, even if specialized regimes of international law can be 
self-contained, they seem to be embedded within general 
international law.328  Indeed, diverse specialized courts still rely on 
that same general international law in addition to more specialized 
bodies of law in settling the disputes brought before them,329 and at 
the same time, these specialized bodies of law in turn become a part 
 
 324. See id. at 112. 
 325. Id. at 119; see also id. at 126 (“By century’s end, there is increasing use of a private law 
analogy to explain the international legal order.  From diverse powers operating in overlapping 
spheres, a unified sovereignty emerges, analogous in competence to the individual, subject to 
one law.”). 
 326. See ICJ Statute, supra note 317, art. 38(1)(c). 
 327. See Abi-Saab, supra note 229, at 920.  This also is the case even though the ICJ 
ostensibly never has based one of its decisions on the general principles of law.  See Hugh 
Thirlway, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1960-1989, 61 BRIT. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 1, 110-11 (1990). 
 328. See Simma & Pulkowski, supra note 225, at 500.  See also Consolidated Report, supra 
note 200, ¶¶ 435-38 (noting how the European Court of Human Rights applies general 
international law); Marcelo Kohen, Comment, Treaty Law: There is No Need for Special 
Regimes, in UNITY AND DIVERSITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 12, at 241. 
 329. See Pauwelyn, supra note 283, at 911. 
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of general international law, at least concerning the secondary rules 
of international law.330  In short, the fallback position of general 
international law makes it possible to circumscribe all bodies of 
international law into one large unit. 
Third, even though there may be more competing actors in the 
system that try to make different normative systems, as Koskenniemi 
and Leino point out, this does not necessarily mean that there 
currently exist distinct bodies of law that are irreconcilable.  On the 
contrary, as the analysis of Part II demonstrates, there are significant 
overlaps even among the most dissimilar bodies of law, where overlap 
occurs without one subsuming the other.  This quasi-melding of 
different branches of international law can add considerably to the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of international law in that decision-
makers charged with interpretation are helping to relieve perceived 
tensions between these branches that have existed since the end of 
the Cold War by considering (and perhaps even reconciling) these 
tensions.331  Although those charged with interpreting and applying 
investment treaties have not traditionally been known for considering 
norms from other branches of international law when making their 
decisions,332 this Article suggests than this might be changing.  
Nicolaidis and Tong see lawyers as fearing the “growing overlap and 
confusion of mandate between different legal regimes and, as a result, 
a duplication of efforts and a waste of resources.”333  While it is 
acknowledged that overlap and even potential conflict of different 
legal regimes may exist, these are not believed to be things that 
should illicit fear.334  After all, the international legal system seems to 
have been sufficiently robust and flexible to have weathered both hot 
and cold wars of the past few centuries.  Moreover, international 
decision-makers are adequately respectful of other courts in 
minimizing outright conflicts, thus adding a degree of authority to 
 
 330. See Wellens, supra note 253, at 28 (“Special fields remain an integral part of general 
international law and this holds true for each of the secondary rules reviewed in this volume, 
with the exception being made, one has to admit, for the Community legal order.”).  See also id. 
at 25-31 (discussing how common secondary rules throughout the specialized bodies of 
international law lend significant coherence to the system). 
 331. See Philippe Sands, Searching for Balance: Concluding Remarks, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 
198, 202-03 (2002). 
 332. See id. 
 333. Nicolaidis & Tong, supra note 269, at 1351. 
 334. The word “proliferation”—as in the proliferation of international tribunals and 
actors—does not help in alleviating fear, inasmuch as that term is associated with weapons of 
mass destruction.  See Abi-Saab, supra note 229, at 925; Rudolf, supra note 203, at 389-90. 
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decisions that reflect some unity in the legal order.335  As the ILC 
Study Group noted, “In international law, there is a strong 
presumption against normative conflict . . . [which] extends to 
adjudication as well.”336  Therefore, commentators must be careful not 
to exaggerate the differences between bodies of law to the point of 
portraying the unity of international law as being threatened.337 
This Part has attempted to apply the generalizations from the 
technical analysis of arbitration cases in Part I into a broader 
theoretical framework.  Although these observations do not resolve 
the debate over the fragmentation of international law, they indicate 
that international law perhaps is more unified than some 
commentators would assert.  Indeed, the porous nature of special 
regimes makes it so that decision-makers in any one regime are free 
to borrow norms from other special regimes in interpreting and 
applying their own norms.  This is, at least, what has been observed in 
an admittedly limited number of international arbitration cases where 
the arbitral tribunal has borrowed from human rights jurisprudence 
without necessarily creating a conflict between these two special 
regimes.  Such examples of overlap between specialized bodies of 
international law ought not to be overlooked. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has identified some of the ways international 
arbitration has relied on human rights jurisprudence.  Although these 
bodies of law are not united per se, the examples laid out in Part I 
show that there is more of a connection between them than 
commentators might think.  Despite such positive overlaps, they still 
are portrayed in the literature as generally conflicting bodies of law.  
Changing the perception might take much energy, given how 
international law continues to be taught and thought of as having 
such discrete, disconnected subfields.338  Such a compartmentalized 
approach to international law causes problems, which Brownlie 
summarizes well: 
A related problem is the tendency to fragmentation of law which 
characterizes the enthusiastic legal literature. The assumption is 
made that there are discrete subjects, such as “international human 
 
 335. See Rudolf, supra note 203, at 409-10. 
 336. Consolidated Report, supra note 200, ¶ 37. 
 337. See Rao, supra note 253, at 934. 
 338. See Philippe Sands, Treaty, Custom and the Cross-Fertilization of International Law, 1 
YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 85, 88 (1998). 
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rights law” or “international law on development.”  As a 
consequence the quality and coherence of international law as a 
whole is threatened.  Thus, for example, points are made as though 
they are novel propositions of human rights law when in fact the 
point concerned had long been recognized in general international 
law.339 
In other words, if practitioners and judges do not embrace the 
interconnectedness of different bodies of law and start thinking of 
international law from a holistic perspective, then they might be 
doomed to reinventing the wheel, so to speak, each time these bodies 
interact and create “novel” issues.  The reality is that the various 
branches of international law increasingly overlap to the point that it 
raises serious doubts over whether there are truly self-contained 
bodies of law.  Although compartmentalization generally can lend the 
impression of order to a field often criticized for its lack thereof,340 
artificial compartmentalization is counterproductive in this case in 
that it denigrates the overarching logic of an otherwise coherent 
whole.  Although a divide still exists in terms of the analytical tools of 
those bodies of law, the numerous cases mentioned above of 
international investment arbitrators relying on human rights 
jurisprudence suggest that the divide gradually is being worn away at 
least in this context.  What this means is that counsel in arbitration 
cases may need to take more of a holistic approach to arguing their 
cases and judges a more creative, cross-sector approach to decision-
making, which can be helped along by law professors and students 
taking a more holistic approach to the teaching and learning of 
international law in the future, as opposed to teaching only “‘the law’ 
as defined in the normative logic of their own law discourses.”341  Such 
a holistic approach to international law might lead to the ultimate 
filling of the legal black hole that the ILC Study Group said exists in 
inter-regime relations.342 
In conclusion, most of the commentators who say that human 
rights ought to be given their due consideration vis-à-vis investors’ 
rights rely on little, if any, actual cases to show that this is not already 
happening.  Rather, much of their relatively normative argumentation 
relies on relatively unpersuasive counterfactual reasoning and 
 
 339. Ian Brownlie, The Rights of Peoples in Modern International Law, in THE RIGHTS OF 
PEOPLES 1, 15 (James Crawford ed., 1988) (also acknowledging that there may be tensions 
between the different so-called compartments of international law). 
 340. See Sands, supra note 338, at 88. 
 341. von Benda-Beckmann, supra note 249, at 40. 
 342. See Consolidated Report, supra note 200, ¶ 492(2). 
02__FRY.DOC 5/27/2008  1:27:26 PM 
2007] EVIDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW’S UNITY 149 
hypothetical situations.  The close study of actual arbitral decisions 
contained within this Article indicates that investment arbitration 
seems to be consistent with human rights, instead of undermining 
them.  It is believed that further analysis of this topic will reveal an 
even greater connection between these two areas of international law.  
While more certainly needs to be done in the world to protect human 
rights and to prevent human rights violations, the answer does not 
seem to be to demonize international investment arbitration. 
